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THE SHALLOW STATE:  
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS  
COMMISSION AND THE NEW DEAL 
 
Daniel R. Ernst*  
 
American lawyers and law professors commonly turn to the New Deal for 
insights into the law and politics of today’s administrative state. Usually, they 
have looked to agencies created in the 1930s that became the foundation of the 
postwar political order. Some have celebrated these agencies; others have 
deplored them as the core of an elitist, antidemocratic Deep State. This Article 
takes a different tack by studying the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and its predecessor the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), an agency 
created before the New Deal. For most of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first two 
presidential terms, the FCC languished within the “Shallow State,” bossed 
about by patronage-seeking politicians, network lobbyists, and the radio bar. 
When Roosevelt finally tried to clean up the agency, his success or failure 
turned on whether the FCC could hire the kind of young, smart, hard-working 
lawyers who at other agencies had proven themselves to be the “shock troops 
of the New Deal.” Only after James Lawrence Fly, formerly general counsel 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, became chairman and hired lawyers like 
himself did the FCC set sail. It cleaned up its licensing of radio stations and 
addressed monopoly power in the industry without becoming the tool of an 
authoritarian president or exceeding its legislative and political mandates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Defenders of the presidential administration of Donald J. Trump have 
sometimes referred to career civil servants as the Deep State, a secret cabal 
intent on undermining a lawfully elected president. As used by conspiracy 
theorists on the fringe of American politics, the term often refers only to 
members of the national security state, who operate beyond the effective 
oversight of elected officials.1 Recently, however, its meaning has expanded to 
encompass civil servants throughout the federal bureaucracy, including gov-
ernment lawyers.2 Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of Russia’s 
																																								 																				
1 See Jack Goldsmith, Paradoxes of the Deep State, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORI-
TARIANISM IN AMERICA 107-08 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (defining the U.S. deep state as 
“US intelligence and related national security bureaucracies endowed with extraordinary 
powers of secret intelligence collection (or access to the fruits of that intelligence)”); Michael 
Crowley, The Deep State Is Real, POLITICO MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2017), https://www.politico. 
com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/deep-state-real-cia-fbi-intelligence-215537 [https://perma. 
cc/2HPT-6XKS] (“Beneath the politics of convenience is the reality that a large segment of 
the U.S. government really does operate without much transparency or public scrutiny, and 
has abused its awesome powers in myriad ways.”). 
2 See Max Fisher, What Happens When You Fight a ‘Deep State’ That Doesn’t Exist, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/americas/what-happens-
when-you-fight-a-deep-state-that-doesnt-exist.html [https://perma.cc/6V82-FQDP] (noting 
that the media and many political commentators “have repurposed ‘deep state’ from its 
formal meaning—a network of civilian and military officials who control or undermine 
democratically elected governments—to a pejorative meant to accuse civil servants of 
illegitimacy and political animus”); Rex Huppke, The Deep State is coming for Trump, and 
it’s using Republicans! CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
opinion/huppke/ct-met-trump-rosenstein-cohen-russia-huppke-20180411-story.html (explain-
ing, sarcastically, that many of the supposed “deep state” actions against the Trump admin-
istration are being performed by Republicans); Editorial, Mueller’s Leak: Deep State 
Doubles Down On Collusion With Democrats, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/muellers-leak-deep-state-doubles-down-on-
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role in the 2016 election drew the most fire, including President Trump’s 
characterization of it as “an attack on our country.”3 In response, others have 
celebrated government lawyers for believing it “crucial for the country that the 
government operate within the law—even if the president wishes otherwise.”4 
Thus, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have recently 
counted Department of Justice lawyers among the ”guardrails of our 
constitutional democracy” that have thus far contained President Trump’s 
authoritarian impulses.5 
One might expect history to provide some insight into whether gov-
ernment lawyers have undermined or preserved liberal democracy in the 
United States. And, in fact, American legal historians have not overlooked 
government lawyers, even though they account for only a small percentage of 
the legal profession.6 The best studied have been the so-called New Deal 
lawyers, several hundred graduates of elite American law schools who arrived 
in Washington at the start of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency.7 In 1939, a 
presidential assistant called them “the ‘shock troops’ of the New Deal—the 
																																								 																				
collusion-with-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/FVF8-L5FX] (arguing that the Mueller investi-
gation is being run by “inside operators at both the Obama Justice Department and the Obama 
FBI…[to] sabotage Trump’s presidency”); Evan Osnos, Trump vs. the “Deep State”: How 
the Administration’s Loyalists Are Quietly Reshaping American Governance, NEW YORKER 
(May 21, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/trump-vs-the-deep-state 
[https://perma.cc/2HKK-H5B4] (detailing how the Trump administration views the “deep 
state” as government “clerks” trying to thwart its initiatives); Julian Zelizer, Opinion, Trump 
Uses IG Report to Spread “Deep State” Conspiracy, CNN (Jun. 16, 2018), https://www.cnn. 
com/2018/06/16/opinions/trump-ig-report-deep-state-conspiracy-opinion-zelizer/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J8PR-3P7J] (discussing how the distrust of government institutions has 
become part of the mainstream political discourse). 
3 Trump Calls Probe by Special Counsel Mueller into Election Meddling ‘an Attack on Our 
Country,’ PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-
calls-probe-by-special-counsel-mueller-into-election-meddling-an-attack-on-our-country 
[https://perma.cc/HL2M-5C6U]. 
4 Fareed Zakaria, America’s Deep State — of Law and Lawyers, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2018), 
https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/2018/4/20/americas-deep-state-of-law-and-lawyers [https:// 
perma.cc/L4NY-GFHA]. 
5 See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 1, 177–78, 203 (2018) 
(noting the resistance that Department of Justice officials have exhibited against authoritarian 
commands from the president). 
6 The American Bar Association estimates that one eighth of the American legal profession 
works in government or the public sector. Government, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, https://www. 
americanbar.org/topics/govt/ [https://perma.cc/3CTM-GAKB] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).    
7 For the scattered precursors, see Daniel R. Ernst, “In a Democracy We Should Distribute 
the Lawyers”: The Campaign for a Federal Legal Service, 1933–1945, 58 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 4, 8–9 (2018) (discussing the hiring practices of lawyers in the federal government 
during the early 20th century). 
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men who really get the tremendous volume of work done that must be done.”8 
Some legal historians have applauded these men (and women) for restraining 
capitalism, expanding public investment, protecting workers, and creating a 
social safety net.9 Others have chided them for stopping short of truly trans-
formative measures10 or for imposing their own modernist values on American 
society, politics, and constitutional doctrine.11 
Because these scholars were trying to understand the political order the 
New Deal created, they have mostly studied agencies created during the New 
Deal. They have told us relatively little about so-called old-line agencies, the 
frequently plodding, often ineffectual, and sometimes corrupt bureaus, boards, 
and commissions that had little if any place in Roosevelt’s reform agenda. As 
a result, we know much more about the New Deal origins of the so-called Deep 
State than the contemporaneous Shallow State, those parts of the federal 
bureaucracy lacking the ability to develop and implement statutorily 
promulgated policies over the opposition of partisan actors and regulated 
interests.12 As long as critics of the federal bureaucracy have merely harassed 
																																								 																				
8 Letter from James H. Rowe, Jr., to Thomas G. Corcoran (Jan. 1939), in THOMAS G. COR-
CORAN PAPERS, box 211 (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, DC) [hereinafter CORCORAN PAPERS]. 
9 See generally, Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty 
in the New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL 
LECTURES (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937–
1947 (1981); LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY (1990); PETER H. IRONS, THE 
NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS: A NEW LOOK AT 
THE NEW DEAL (1988); WILLIAM LASSER, BENJAMIN V. COHEN: ARCHITECT OF THE NEW 
DEAL (2002); JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, THE NEW DEALERS: POWER POLITICS IN THE AGE OF 
ROOSEVELT 107–245 (1993); JASON SCOTT SMITH, BUILDING NEW DEAL LIBERALISM: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 1933–1956 (2006); KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF 
DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 (2016). On 
female lawyers during the New Deal, consult DOROTHY S. SHAWHAN & MARTHA H. SWAIN, 
LUCY SOMERVILLE HOWORTH: NEW DEAL LAWYER, POLITICIAN, AND FEMINIST FROM THE 
SOUTH (2006); Karen M. Tani, Portia’s Deal, 87 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 549–70 (2012) 
and MARLENE TRESTMAN, FAIR LABOR LAWYER: THE REMARKABLE LIFE OF NEW DEAL 
ATTORNEY AND SUPREME COURT ADVOCATE BESSIE MARGOLIN (2016). 
10 See generally, JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN MODERN AMERICA 158–230 (1976); IRONS, supra note 9; CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE 
STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT 
IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985). 
11 See generally, G. EDWARD WHITE, Revisiting the New Deal Legal Generation, in 
INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 132–
203 (1994). 
12 The National Recovery Administration, which relied on industry to draw up codes of fair 
competition, has been studied at length, but it employed many elite lawyers. It is less 
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career civil servants, this oversight was perhaps understandable.  Now that the 
Trump administration has undermined the career civil service by leaving 
vacancies unfilled, instituting reassignments, and altering personnel proce-
dures, a study of an old-line agency in the New Deal can provide much-needed 
insight into what Americans might lose if authoritarian assaults on bureaucracy 
succeed.13 The most likely alternative to the Deep State (broadly defined) is 
not some natural order of freedom but a variety of crony capitalism, with favors 
distributed to the powerful and burdens visited upon the vulnerable under 
easily manipulated, ad hoc standards.  From this vantage point, government 
lawyers appear less like the “shock troops” of the New Deal than the defenders 
of liberal democracy within a burgeoning administrative state. 
Because it was an old-line agency for most of the 1930s, only to be 
New Dealed at the end of the decade, the FCC is an unusually revealing 
exemplar of the Shallow State. Created as the Federal Radio Commission in 
1927 and reestablished with its present name and jurisdiction over telegraphy 
and telephony in 1934, the FCC had as its principal mission the issuance of 
licenses to radio stations and the policing of the nation’s airwaves. Quaint as 
that sounds in the Internet Age, the FCC oversaw a medium that reached into 
millions of homes, enriched licensees, and gave Roosevelt and other New 
Dealers a way to circumvent hostile newspaper editors and speak directly to 
voters. Despite its importance, it became a perennial New Deal problem 
																																								 																				
instructive a comparison than the old-line agency studied here. See generally, KENNETH 
FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN AMERICA’S NEW DEAL 1 (1995); 
IRONS, supra note 9, at 15–107. 
13 See generally Ben L. Erdreich and Steven L. Katz, The Federal Merit System Keeps Our 
Democracy Safe. Trump and the Senate are Killing Its Guardian, WASH. POST (February 12, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-federal-merit-system-keeps-our-democra 
cy-safe-trump-and-the-senate-are-killing-its-guardian/2019/02/12/d1984726-2f0e-11e9-8ad 
3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html?utm_term=.cf06cfd2353a [https://perma.cc/Y6SQ-FG2F]; Lisa 
Rein, Trump Loyalists at VA Shuffling, Purging Employees Before New Secretary Takes 
Over, WASH. POST (Jul. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-loyal 
ists-at-va-shuffling-purging-employees-before-new-secretary-takes-over/2018/07/18/a4462 
aae-892d-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html?utm_term=.113b780fd848 [https://perma.cc/P4 
AQ-SETD] (“Current and former employees — and now alarmed members of Congress — call 
the reshuffling [at the Department of Veterans Affairs by the Trump administration] a loyalty 
purge that is targeting the alleged political sympathies of civil servants whose jobs are, by 
definition, nonpartisan”); Lorraine Woellert, Trump Issues Orders Making It Easier to Fire 
Federal Employees, POLITICO (May 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/25/ 
trump-federal-employees-unions-civil-servants-609167 [https://perma.cc/KY5K-ALBB] (ex-
plaining that “a series of executive orders [which aim] to weaken the influence of government 
unions and make it easier for agencies to fire civil servants” may also “reduce accountability or 
punish whistleblowers”). 
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child.14 Congress saddled it with a seven-member board and granted it sweeping 
legislative power to act as “public convenience, interest, or necessity” required.15 
Lacking a strong chairperson and an aggressive legal staff to police admin-
istrators, it was wracked by “dissension, wrangling, and inefficiency,” harried by 
patronage-seeking politicians, overawed by the networks, and manipulated by a 
self-interested, specialized bar.16 
During his first presidential term, Roosevelt never attempted the 
Herculean feat of cleansing the FCC because congressional demand for its 
patronage was so great. In his second term, however, Roosevelt finally appointed 
an honest but ineffectual chair in 1937 and a much more ambitious and 
successful one in 1939. The former never managed to transform the Law 
Department into an effective check on administrators, but the latter recruited a 
platoon of shock troops to revitalize the agency. Together, they minimized 
external influence, combatted concentration in the industry, and resisted illiberal 
policies emanating from the president or other members of his administration. 
The history of the FCC suggests that without the kind of government 
lawyers and other career civil servants pilloried today as the Deep State, federal 
agencies that distribute valuable economic privileges can devolve into a 
Shallow State, whose officials heed the business interests that best satisfy their 
partisan needs rather than implement democratically established policies. 
Lawyers, if formed into an insular, specialized bar, might find their own niche 
in the swampy ecosystem. But if selected for their legal ability and organized 
into a demanding and rewarding legal division, lawyers can successfully 
enforce statutory mandates and limit partisan exercises of discretionary 
economic power, even when attempted by a president less committed to liberal 
democracy than was Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
 
I. PATRONAGE-SEEKING CONGRESSMEN 
 
Regularly scheduled radio broadcasts by nonprofit and commercial 
stations date from 1921 and quickly attained great popularity during the 1920s. 
A survey in May 1928 tallied 12 million receivers serving 40 million people.17 As 
																																								 																				
14 See, e.g., Doris Fleeson, M’Ninch Blasts Craven on “Freedom of Radio” Stand, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 1939, at 448 (describing a conflict over censorship between Chairman 
McNinch and commissioner Craven). 
15 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, §§4(a), 303 (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). 
16 See Wheeler, M’Ninch Favor 3-Member Revamped FCC, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 
25, 1939, at 19 (recounting the statements of Senator Wheeler, who thought that the FCC 
needed reorganization to provide guidance on questions of licensing, ownership and 
monopolistic practices). 
17 Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L. J. 245, 246 n. 1 (1929). 
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the radio audience expanded, politicians realized that a recipient of a broadcast 
license would swap favorable news coverage and campaign contributions for a 
state-created monopoly of a place on the dial. Their first impulse was to hand 
out radio licenses much like the jobs, contracts, grants, and other benefits that 
had fueled party machines since Andrew Jackson’s day. The job of the national 
parties’ patronage managers was to see that each state party received its share. 
Following this logic, the federal government sought to award as many licenses 
as possible to solidify support for the party-in-power across the nation’s con-
gressional districts.18 Particularly in the 1920s, as networks were still forming, 
politicians were often advocates of localism. Even after the rise of the networks, 
congressmen who otherwise were disinclined to battle monopolies loudly de-
nounced the radio trusts if networks interfered too much with the programming 
and advertising revenues of constituents who owned local affiliates. 
But radio licenses differed from more traditional forms of patronage in 
crucial respects. First, the national resource they parceled out, the airwaves, 
was, in economic parlance, a nonexclusive, rivalrous good. No private party 
could exclude another from occupying the same location on the radio spectrum 
without the help of the state, and a grant of the use of a frequency to one 
applicant foreclosed the use of that part of the dial by another. “We have a 
problem entirely unlike what you have in the Public Works Administration, 
where Congressmen and Senators write in regarding a water works project in 
a locality,” explained an FCC lawyer, “because here you have the granting of 
one precluding the granting of another, and both applicants are quite apt to ask 
their Congressmen to write a letter about it.”19 Second, a grant of a new or 
revised license could create interference that harmed licensees in other regions 
or on neighboring frequencies.20 
Although the difference was obvious to any serious student of radio 
policy, it took an utter breakdown in radio broadcasting to force Congress to 
act. Soon after the first commercial broadcast in 1920, Commerce Secretary 
Herbert Hoover attempted to regulate the industry under prewar legislation 
drafted primarily to meet the needs of ship-to-shore radiotelephony. He 
managed to impose some order through a series of committees and conferences 
until 1926, when a federal court decision and an opinion of the U.S. Attorney 
																																								 																				
18 Cf. RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN 
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 204–12 (1986) (explaining 
how, during the Jacksonian era and into the 20th century, the federal government distributed 
resources and benefits to empowered political parties). 
19 Conference of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (Oct. 22, 
1939), at 3, 4–5, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, record group 60, entry 
376, box 3 (on file with the National Archives, College Park, MD). 
20 MERLE FAINSOLD, LINCOLN GORDON AND JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., GOVERNMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 387 (3d ed. 1959). 
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General declared that he lacked the statutory authority to limit licensees to 
specified frequencies, power, and times. Chaos ensued, as new stations 
appeared overnight, “air pirates” jumped from one frequency to the next, and 
well-financed stations boosted their power to beggar their neighbors on the 
dial. All agreed that national legislation was required, but they divided on 
whether to leave the allocation of the airwaves with the Commerce Department 
or entrust it to a new agency. A majority of the House of Representatives 
wanted the job given to an executive department, headed by a political 
appointee; most Senators thought only an independent commission with a 
bipartisan membership could provide the national perspective radio policy 
required.21 The Radio Act of 1927 was the awkward result. It created a Federal 
Radio Commission (FRC) to allocate radio licenses at the public’s con-
venience, interest, or necessity—a task, it was thought, that could be completed 
in a year. Thereafter, the licensing power was to pass to Hoover’s Commerce 
Department. The FRC would survive only as a kind of appellate body, roughly 
analogous to the Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor to the today’s U.S. 
Tax Court. No more than three of the FRC’s five commissioners could be from 
the same political party, and each was to represent a different zone of the 
nation. Because each commissioner deferred to the other’s decisions, each was, 
a Senator charged, “almost a czar” in his own zone.22 Although the statute 
required licenses to be distributed among the different States and communities 
as to give fair, efficient, and equitable radio service, the initial distribution 
favored the Northeast and Midwest.23 In response, a coalition of southern 
																																								 																				
21 PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 47-106 (1980); see also Report of the Standing Committee on Radio Law, 54 
A.B.A. REP. 404, 439–442 (1929) (explaining that the only substantive difference between 
the House and Senate bills on updating radio regulation was that the House bill “confided 
the administration of the Act to the Secretary of Commerce, subject to a supervisory or 
appellate review by a commission,” whereas the Senate “placed the administration of radio 
entirely and directly in the hands of the Commission”); ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 301–02 (1941) (discussing the “fundamental” 
disagreement between the House and Senate over radio regulation as being whether it should 
be overseen by a new independent commission or the executive department). 
22 Nomination of Thad H. Brown to Be a Member of the Federal Radio Commission: Hearing 
before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 72d Cong. 19 (1932) (debating the 
political nature of Brown’s career and his qualifications to be a commissioner). 
23 See Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (dividing the 
United States into five zones in § 2, each represented by one commissioner); see generally, 
Mark Goodman & Mark Gring, The Ideological Fight over Creation of the Federal Radio 
Commission in 1927, 26 JOURNALISM HIST. 117–24 (2000) (providing a general history of 
the ideological conflict over national radio licensing as to whether executive authority or 
agency independence would govern). 
 
Vol. 4:3]      The Shallow State 
	
	
411 
Democrats and western progressive Republicans passed an amendment 
requiring the FRC to award an equal number of broadcast licenses to each zone 
and, within a zone, to each state in accordance with its population.24 
The act set a maximum duration for licenses of three years but no 
minimum, thus allowing the FRC to make licenses good for only three months 
at a time. The short duration eased the commission’s initial task of reducing the 
733 broadcasters in 1927 to a number more readily accommodated by the 
available 96 channels. Instead of initiating revocation hearings to reduce a broad-
caster’s frequency, power, or hours of operation, they could simply let an 
existing license expire, refuse to renew it or renew it on less desirable terms, and 
let the applicant try to show that the order was not in the public interest, necessity, 
or convenience. So great was this tactical advantage that the commission kept 
the maximum duration of licenses under one year until 1939. The brief duration 
of the licenses also had consequences for the patronage system. Because 
broadcasters knew they might lose their license in a negative review by the 
commission’s staff or a challenge from a new applicant, they had ample reason 
to be solicitous of congressmen whose intervention might save them. Even 
though the FRC renewed the vast majority of licenses without a hearing, broad-
casters constantly complained of the precariousness of their most valuable asset.  
Conflict among potential licensees was pervasive and intractable. One 
divide was between non-profit stations, owned by educational, religious, and 
labor groups, and commercial broadcasters, eager to shoulder them aside in 
pursuit of advertising revenue generated by the new radio networks. The non-
profits suffered a major setback in 1928 when the FRC promulgated a 
comprehensive allocation of the airwaves, General Order 40, assigning them 
undesirable hours at low power on crowded frequencies. After a few years of 
declining audiences and dwindling finances, many surrendered their licenses to 
for-profit rivals in exchange for a few hours’ airtime, only to see even this 
pittance discontinued when stations affiliated with networks then demanded the 
time slots for their own programming. Nonprofit broadcasters clamored for a 
statutorily decreed share of the airwaves but were decisively defeated in January 
1935, when the FCC opted to continue the pro-commercial policies of the FRC.25 
																																								 																				
24 These requirements would plague the commission until their repeal in 1936. See Senate 
Committee Reports Bill to End Zone System, HEINL RADIO BUS. LETTER (Jan. 3, 1936) 
(describing the population equalization text of the Davis amendment and noting that it was 
a thorn in the side of the FRC and the FCC engineering department); MURRAY EDELMAN, 
THE LICENSING OF RADIO SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1927 TO 1947, 47-50 (1950) 
(noting the inherent engineering difficulties the FRC faced in complying with the Davis 
Amendment and its eventual abolition with a more lax standard for granting radio licenses). 
25 See ROSEN, supra note 21, at 136-37, 161-71. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL 
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An additional complication arose from the need for “clear channel” 
stations. Even the most powerful “groundwave” signals traveling along the 
Earth’s surface died out after only 100 miles, leaving remote regions, too thinly 
settled to support their own stations, unserved.  Skywave signals, which bounce 
off a region of the ionosphere, could reach such areas, but only if no other 
station broadcasted on the same frequency. In 1928 the FRC granted forty clear 
channel licenses by forcing other stations to leave the frequencies at sunset, 
even if based half a continent away.26 The result was another offense against 
the localism of American politics. A Senator from Ohio, for example, professed 
not to understand why “a wonderful station” in his state had to stop broadcasting 
when the sun set in California so that a clear-channel station in San Francisco 
could broadcast unimpeded. “It is indefensible,” he protested, “that a station in 
the Eastern part of the country cannot use the time of a station on a Pacific 
coast.”27 It was particularly so, he might have added, when the policy prevented 
him from broadcasting to his constituents over the Ohio station.28 
“Probably no quasi-judicial body was ever subject to so much 
congressional pressure as the Federal Radio Commission,” concluded a study in 
1932.29 When the FRC required more than the year specified in the Radio Act 
of 1927 to complete its work, at first Congress extended and appropriated for it 
only on a temporary basis. The proponents of a permanent commission finally 
prevailed in December 1929. Even so, commissioners were exceedingly 
attentive to legislators’ wishes. “Who can . . . disregard the judgment of a United 
States Senator?” one chairman pleaded at a congressional hearing.30 A Senator’s 
judgment was even harder to overlook when expressed in person. James 
Couzens, a liberal Senator from Michigan, was surprised to learn that James 
																																								 																				
OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 12-37, 210-25 (1993) (describing the struggle of non-
profit and educational broadcasting to maintain its existence in the early years of federally 
regulated broadcasting, and its ultimate failure with the advent of for-profit commercial 
broadcasting); SUSAN SMULYAN, SELLING RADIO: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN 
BROADCASTING, 1920-1934, 130-33, 142-53 (1994) (discussing the failed attempts of 
nonprofit broadcasters to gain a greater share of radio airwave licensing leading up to the 
enactment of the 1934 Communications Act). 
26 See Report of the Standing Committee on Radio Law, 54 A.B.A. REP. 420-22 (1929) 
(speaking generally about the application of high-band radio frequencies and international 
broadcasting); Report of the Standing Committee on Communications, 53 A.B.A. REP. 373 
(1930) (explaining the tradeoff between rural and urban broadcast coverage caused by 
“duplicated use by regional or local stations”). 
27 Nomination of Thad H. Brown, supra note 22, at 22. 
28 Id. at 21-22.  
29 LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY, 
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 55 (1932). 
30 Id. 
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Watson of Indiana and another Senator personally argued the case for an appli-
cant at a renewal proceeding. Did not the two believe their presence would have 
“more influence than [that of] an ordinary citizen?” Couzens inquired at a congress-
ional hearing.31 “If it would not,” Watson replied, “I have lived in vain.”32 
Radio remained a political football after 1934, when the jurisdiction of 
the FRC over radio was combined with that of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) over telephony and telegraphy and entrusted to a new, 
seven-member Federal Communications Commission.33 The best-connected 
politicians acquired their influence wholesale, as it were, by placing their own 
man on the commission or its staff. President Franklin D. Roosevelt needed 
these “princes and potentates of the party” to get his legislation through 
Congress and made his appointments to the new commission accordingly.34 
The first chairman was Eugene Sykes, a distinguished Mississippi judge (and 
state Democratic committeeman) who did not even own a radio when he was 
named to the original FRC. He did have the backing of Senator Pat Harrison, 
and Harrison had a chit to call in with then-President Calvin Coolidge. Harrison 
also had a chit with FDR in 1934 and arranged for Sykes to serve as chair until 
a lame duck congressman from New York could complete his term and replace 
him. The lame duck, Anning Prall, enjoyed FDR’s blessing not because of his 
knowledge of the FCC’s affairs, but because his “closest friend” was Senator 
Robert F. Wagner, a vital ally of the president.35 Norman Case combined prior 
political experience and patrician ways, thanks to an ancestry dating back to 
the Mayflower. He had charmed FDR when the two served on the Executive 
Committee of the Governors Conference of the United States.36 George Henry 
Payne, a former newspaperman and the FCC’s loudest and loosest cannon, 
managed to assemble an imposing sheaf of senatorial endorsements, including 
one from Wagner, in his successful quest for an appointment.37 
																																								 																				
31 Nomination of Thad H. Brown, supra note 22, at 32. 
32 Id. 
33 81 CONG. REC. 9604 (1937) (Burton Wheeler); 81 CONG. REC. 2336 (1937) (Wallace White). 
34 Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE POLITICS OF 
UPHEAVAL 409 (1960).  
35 President Roosevelt Reappoints Commission Chairman Prall for Seven Years; Confir-
mation Soon, TELECOMM. REP., May 23, 1935, at 2A. 
36 See Brief Sketch of Norman Stanley Case, in RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION, record group 173, entry 100A, box 10 (on file with the National Archives, College 
Park, MD) (providing a curriculum vitae of Norman Case) [hereinafter referred to as FCC 
RECORDS]; The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor 375 (1955-1956) (on file with the Columbia 
Center for Oral History Archives, Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, NY). 
37 G.H. Payne is Dead; FCC Ex-Official, 68, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1945, at 37 (providing an 
obituary of George Henry Payne, noting that his “tenure on the FCC was ended in mystery”); 
Confidential Memo re: George Henry Payne (n.d.), in PRESIDENT’S OFFICIAL FILE, number 2001 
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Hampson Gary was endorsed by the Texas congressional delegation 
and such other senatorial heavyweights as Arkansas’s Joe Robinson, but he 
received only the one-year appointment when the staggered terms of the new 
FCC were handed out. As compensation, he was appointed general counsel 
after his term expired.38 Thad Brown, another carryover from the FRC, had 
originally been its general counsel, named by Herbert Hoover as a reward for 
managing his presidential campaign in Ohio in 1932. He became a 
commissioner in 1933 and served until 1940.39 Even the post of secretary, 
capable of expediting or delaying proceedings, was a valuable plum. When 
Iowa’s congressional delegation named it as the price of their support for 
FDR’s “Court-packing” plan, the president agreed, even though it was already 
promised to somebody else.40 
Rumors of intervention in specific cases by high administration offi-
cials circulated widely, but few smoking guns turned up. “There is a great 
delicacy which cannot be escaped when the White House takes up a radio 
problem with the Communications Commission,” FDR’s press secretary 
explained to a political scientist. “The story is too long and too delicate to 
write.”41 One tale he might have told began soon after the 1936 general 
election, when the defeated governor of Michigan, Frank Murphy, asked the 
White House to find out why the FCC was investigating a proposed sale of a 
California license to a Detroit businessman who had been a “staunch and 
																																								 																				
(on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY) [hereinafter referred to as 
OF]; The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 378 (calling “an erratic, lazy, 
undependable, amusing cuss”); Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, Washington Daily Merry-
Go-Round (Dec. 24, 1938), https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/pearson%3A423 
04#page/1/mode/1up [https://perma.cc/QT3D-PVPG]. 
38 FCC Dismisses Gary as General Counsel: Dempsey is Designated as Successor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1938, at 17 (noting that Gary was General Counsel at the FCC until he was 
ousted due to inefficient management); Joe T. Robinson to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jun. 23, 
1937), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 210 (recommending Gary for commissioner 
to the President); Spearman Resigns as FCC General Counsel, TELECOM. REP., Jun. 27, 
1935, at 5 (providing Gary received the General Counsel position as compensation for only 
getting a one-year appointment at the FCC).   
39 Brief Sketch of Colonel Thad H. Brown, in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A, 
box 10 (noting Brown’s appointment as General Counsel of the FRC). 
40 Federal Communications Commission, 17 FORTUNE 61 (May 1938); SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Apr. 29, 1937, in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 250 (noting that Brown’s 
appointment was the price of the Iowa delegation’s support for FDR’s court packing plan); The 
Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 382 (explaining that the secretary of the 
commission was sometimes a policy-making official on political matters, but not generally); 
Rodney Dutcher, The New Deal in Washington, St. Louis Star & Times, Aug. 6, 1934, at 3.  
41 Letter from Stephen Early to Louis Brownlow (May 19, 1937), in OF, supra note 37, 
number 1059, box 1. 
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generous friend of the President’s and of myself during the recent campaign.”42 
Chairman Sykes explained that the price was remarkably high for a low-power 
station that served a small part of Beverly Hills and had to shut down every 
evening to make way for a clear channel licensee. Sykes did not spell out the 
obvious, that he suspected the “staunch and generous friend” intended to renew 
the license on more favorable terms and reap a substantial profit.43 Still, after 
the exchange with the White House, Sykes and two other commissioners 
approved the sale. Several years later the commission granted the buyer’s 
request to broadcast to most of the Los Angeles basin day and night.44  
 
II. THE NETWORKS 
 
A second force besieging the FCC was the broadcast networks. The 
National Broadcasting Company was the first to be organized, in 1926, by 
RCA, General Electric, and Westinghouse, whose patent pool permitted them 
to control much of the radio industry. It maintained two national networks, the 
Red, which carried popular programming, and the Blue, which offered more 
sophisticated fare. Under RCA’s David Sarnoff, NBC grew rapidly and offered 
listeners an increasingly diverse schedule of music, drama, comedy, and 
variety programs. By the end of 1927, NBC owned or had as affiliates some 
forty-eight stations, including many of the most profitable in the country. As 
its affiliates grew, so did its revenues.  In 1927 an hour on the Red network 
between 7 and 11 P.M. cost $3,770; in 1931, $10,000.  In the first half of 1932, 
NBC received just under $1 million in advertising from a single customer, the 
American Tobacco Company.45 
The Columbia Broadcasting System had a shakier start but found its 
footing in 1928, when William Paley, the son of an investor, became its 
president.46 Like NBC, CBS acquired stations of its own, including the flagship 
																																								 																				
42 In re Beverly Hills Broadcasting, 4 F.C.C. 250-53 (1937) (approving the transfer of Beverly 
Hills Broadcasting Corporation to George A. Richards); Letter from Frank Murphy to Steve Early 
(Nov. 17, 1936) (asking that the application of George A. Richards be expedited).  
43 Letter from Eugene Sykes to Stephen Early (Nov. 21, 1936) (discussing the reasons for the 
delay in a broadcast licensing grant due to a disproportionately low buying price). 
44 Radio Station License, KMPC (Feb. 3, 1940), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry WW-98, 
box 18 (displaying approved status). FDR also sent emissaries to urge the FCC not to award 
licenses to supporters of his opponents during the 1936 campaign. See, e.g., RICHARD W. STEELE, 
PROPAGANDA IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE MEDIA, 1933-
1941, at 177 n. 34 (1985) (providing examples of where FDR influenced radio licensing). 
45 ROSEN, supra note 21, at 89-91, 116, 118, 158-59.  
46 Michael J. Socolow, To Network a Nation: N.B.C., C.B.S. and the Development of National 
Network Radio in the United States, 1925-1950, at 82 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgetown University) (on file with the Georgetown University Library). 
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WABC in New York, but its greatest innovation was a standard contract that 
barred affiliates from carrying the programs of other networks, guaranteed 
CBS’s advertisers access to listeners in the peak evening hours, and gave the 
network an option on other time with only four weeks’ notice.47 Through 
ownership and affiliation CBS grew rapidly until it had 107 owned or affiliated 
stations in 1937 to the 104 of NBC, which had adopted a contract much like 
CBS’s.48 The two companies’ share of radio stations increased from just over 
6 percent in 1927 to 41 percent in 1940.49 CBS and NBC owned or were 
affiliated with all but 3 of the 40 clear channel stations in 1931.50 They 
accounted for 58 of the 62 5,000-watt stations in 1935.51 By then a third 
network, the Mutual Broadcasting System, had joined them. Owned by two 
stations (one of them WGN), it eschewed exclusive contracts in favor of the 
syndication of “The Lone Ranger” and other programs.52 
As the networks grew, so did the financial stakes for commercial 
broadcasting. By 1934, advertising for the entire industry totaled $72 million.53 
Gross revenue exceeded $86 million in 1935 and was estimated at $108 million 
in 1936.54 Network stations and affiliates grabbed far more than their share.55 
In 1938, the 310 unaffiliated stations had an aggregate loss of $150,000; the 
327 affiliated with NBC, CBS, or Mutual had profits of $9.7 million.56 
The FRC and FCC abetted the concentration of network power by 
favoring affiliates when stations competed for the same license or frequency. 
Now and then a commissioner would make his bias explicit: “What has 
education contributed to radio?” Harold Lafount demanded in 1931, “[n]ot one 
thing. What has commercialism contributed? Everything—the lifeblood of the 
industry.”57 More common was the tight-lipped approach of Eugene Sykes, 
																																								 																				
47 Id. at 82, 85-86 (providing that in addition to acquiring stations, CBS created a groundbreaking 
standard contract); ROSEN, supra note 21 at 148-49 (discussing the standard contract’s bar on 
affiliates); Socolow, supra note 46 at 154 (explaining the standard contract’s option on other time).  
48 81 CONG. REC. 2336 (1937) (Wallace White). 
49 Robert W. McChesney, Free Speech and Democracy! Louis G. Caldwell, the American Bar 
Association and the Debate over the Free Speech Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 1928-
1938, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 358 (1991) (“[F]rom just over 6 percent”); Socolow, supra 
note 46, at 107 (“41 percent in 1940”). 
50 McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 49 at 358. 
51 Id. at 359. 
52 Socolow, supra note 46, at 101-03; MICHAEL STAMM, SOUND BUSINESS: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, 
AND THE POLITICS OF NEW MEDIA 71-74 (2011). 
53 McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 49 at 359. 
54 81 CONG. REC. 2333 (1937) (Wallace White). 
55 McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 49 at 359. 
56 Socolow, supra note 46, 107.  
57 McChesney, Free Speech, supra note 49, at 356-57. 
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who presided over the FRC’s first hearings, oversaw the agency’s trial exam-
iners, and chaired the FCC’s Broadcast Division, a panel of three commi-
ssioners: 1) Sykes, 2) a second commissioner serving full-time, and 3) the 
chairman serving part-time.58 From 1934 to 1937 all three commissioners 
decided applications, subject only to an appeal to the full commission.59 “The 
calm of the deep South pervades his manner, his overheated office, his ideas 
about radio,” Fortune reported of Sykes.60 “Slight and solemn,” with “a voice 
so soft it almost purrs,” Sykes declared broadcasting “one of the cleanest 
industries in the United States, suh.”61 He made no broad statements of 
principle in his opinions for the commission but applied the “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity” standard in an ad hoc and rather opaque 
way to the case before him.62 The only discernible pattern, critics charged, was 
a tendency to make financial status the decisive factor when choosing among 
competitors for a frequency. Typically, this favored network affiliates because 
bankers considered a network contract a valuable asset and were quicker to 
loan to affiliates than independents.63 
Radio lawyers appreciated Sykes’s reserved, judicial manner when 
presiding at hearings, and when he retired from the commission in April 
1939, many praised his even-handedness and integrity.64 Still, rumors cir-
culated that Sykes was under the influence of CBS vice president Harry 
Butcher. These rumors gained credibility after what became known as the 
“Willard Hotel Incident.” In 1935 the FCC, acting without a public hearing, 
awarded a company in Schenectady, New York, a new, high-power license. 
A Binghamton station then applied for the same license and demanded a 
																																								 																				
58 Louis G. Caldwell, Regulation of Broadcasting by the Federal Government, VARIETY RADIO 
DIRECTORY 1 (1937) at 273; Couzens Bill May Lay Bare FCC Quarrels, (Hammond, IN) TIMES 
(May 4, 1936); Interview of Rosel H. Hyde by Jack Clifton Fortenberry (Aug. 16, 1990) at 74-
75, 99 (on file with the Learning Resources Center, Mississippi College, Clinton, MS). 
59 As the chairman who ended the divisional structure of the FCC in 1937 complained, the two 
full-time members of the Broadcast Division effectively determined “all of the applications for 
broadcast stations in the United States, and the other commissioners [had] no say at all about it” 
in the first instance. Hearing Considering the Independent Offices Appropriations Bill for 1940: 
Hearings before the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 76th Cong. 1507 (1939). 
60 Federal Communications Commission, supra note 40, at 61.  
61 Id.  
62 The Communications Act of 1934, Section 303, 73rd Cong., June 19, 1934, at 1082, Statutes 
at Large (containing the “public convenience, interest, or necessity” standard); Interview of Rosel 
H. Hyde, supra note 58; 83 CONG. REC. 7567 (1938) (discussing Sykes in his position as 
commissioner). 
63 Socolow, supra note 46 at 107.  
64 Interview of Rosel H. Hyde, supra note 58, at 2 (noting that Sykes was respected “because of 
his judicial demeanor”). 
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hearing.65 Cecil Mastin, the manager of the Binghamton station, called upon 
CBS’s Butcher for help, but the network executive begged off. “Columbia has 
enough worries of its own with seven stations and its network operations,” he 
told Mastin. “If we got involved in the great number of cases concerning the 
ninety or more Columbia affiliates, we would be like the two wrestlers who got 
all entangled and one of them in desperation bit what he thought was his 
opponent’s toe, only to find that it was his own.” Such scruples did not prevent 
Butcher from kibitzing with Mastin, however. Mastin explained that he was 
chairman of either the state or county Republican committee—Butcher couldn’t 
remember which—and that the manager of the Schenectady station was a 
protégé of Senator Robert F. Wagner and “had the Administration’s blessing.” 
Butcher told Mastin that, “if such was the case, he had two or three strikes on 
him.” Still, Mastin persisted and requested a hearing before an examiner in 
Washington. On the appointed day, September 5, 1935, the hearing went badly 
for Mastin and his team of experts, a leading radio engineer, two well-regarded 
radio lawyers, and the manager of another station. “They were all sore,” Butcher 
reported, “because they felt they had been given a dirty deal by the Examiner.”66 
Disheartened and bitter, the team retired to Mastin’s room at the Will-
ard Hotel and started drinking heavily. Unknown to them, in an adjoining room 
were a visiting friend of Chairman Anning Prall and Prall’s son, Mortimer, 
who was to escort the friend to dinner with his father. When the friend went to 
the closet to retrieve his coat, he heard “loud, boisterous conversation in the 
adjoining room,” including the words “Communications Commission.” He 
called to Mortimer, and the two, crouching in the closet, heard someone say, 
“Well, Columbia has Harry Butcher down here and they must have him here 
for some good reason. He knows his way around. He controls Judge Sykes. He 
can buy the whole damn Commission for $25,000.”  Another speaker declared 
that he was ready to pay twice that sum to retain his frequency. Later, after 
dinner with his father, Mortimer returned to his listening post and heard 
																																								 																				
65 Sykes Demands Probe of Bribery Rumors by FCC Group, HEINL RADIO BUSINESS LETTER, 
Jan. 14, 1936, at 2–3 (explaining that bribery was suspected as the reason for FCC’s awarding 
of the license to the Schenectady company without a hearing); FCC Inquiry on “Fixing” 
Charge Ordered; Investigation by Congress Is Threatened, BROADCASTING, Jan. 15, 1936, 
at 51–52 (“The whole controversy grew out of the application of the Knox Broadcasting Co, 
for a new regional station in Schenectady, N.Y., and the competitive application of WNBF, 
Binghamton, N.Y., for the same facilities.”). 
66All verbatim quotes (except Butcher’s) are second- or third-party hearsay, recorded in 
Statement of Mr. Harry C. Butcher Made to Special Agents Louis Loebel and J. B. Shirley 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, on Jan. 14, 1936, in OF, supra 
note 37, number 1059, box 1. They are generally corroborated by later testimony before the 
commission. 80 CONG. REC. 2267 (1936). 
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someone declare that a certain commissioner, identified only as a “long-eared, 
long-nosed, tight-lipped son of a bitch,” would tell the examiner how to write 
his report. All familiar with the physiognomy of the FCC commissioners 
assumed that the speaker could only have been referring to Judge Sykes.67 
 
 
 
Eugene Octave Sykes (1934)68 
 
Mortimer and the friend reported what they had heard to Chairman 
Prall at dinner that evening. Prall later told Butcher that he did not immediately 
go to Sykes, because he was convinced that “there was not a word of truth” in 
																																								 																				
67 Statement of Mr. Harry C. Butcher, supra note 66; 80 CONG. REC. 2267 (1936).  
68 This photo was retrieved from New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photo-
graph Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress. 
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the overheard conversations.69 Perhaps he believed that, but, if so, why Prall 
asked the FBI to come to his apartment and begin an investigation that very 
evening is not at all apparent. Just as obscure was Prall’s decision to call off 
the investigation a few days later.70 (Perhaps his colleagues’ irritation at “the 
idea that G-men might be trailing them or that secret dictaphones might be 
concealed in their offices” was a factor.)71 December 18 brought another 
reversal when the commissioners voted to put the FBI back on the case. In 
January 1937, the G-men reported that they could find nothing to substan-tiate 
what had been said during the “drunken brawl” at the Willard.72 The 
commission, on Sykes’s motion and after a heated debate, refused to leave 
matters there and voted to conduct its own investigation.73 This proved just as 
fruitless, as no one in Mastin’s room owned up to the reported words, and 
Butcher denied ever having “bought or controlled” any commissioners.74 
Although the Willard Hotel incident ended inconclusively, questions 
about the networks’ influence and conflict among the commissioners persisted. 
Over the next two years, George Henry Payne, “a somewhat eccentric St. 
George-in-search-of-a-Dragon,” kept the FCC in ill repute with leaks to the 
press and sensational but unsubstantiated charges that CBS had corrupted one 
or more of his colleagues.75 A contributor to The Nation, probably parroting 
Payne, attributed the odd course of the investigation of the Willard Hotel 
incident to “squabbles between Sykes and Prall over what looks very much like 
the spoils.”76 Rumor had it that the two had cases assigned to their favorite trial 
examiners whose intermediate reports then reached their preferred outcome, as 
the FCC’s lawyers looked on helplessly.77 Charges of capture by the networks 
thus joined rumors of partisan decision-making to give the FCC a reputation as 
“the most inefficient and ineffectual institution in Washington.”78 
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III. THE RADIO BAR 
 
A third force that bedeviled the FCC usually escaped public notice but 
was a no less persistent challenge to its authority. The radio bar, one FCC general 
counsel recalled, was “a tightly-knit little empire, with quite a hierarchy.”79 At 
its peak stood Louis Goldsborough Caldwell. Born in the comfortable Chicago 
suburb of Oak Park in 1891, Caldwell graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Amherst 
College and with honors from Northwestern University Law School in 1916.80 
As a young man he succumbed to the fervid progressivism of prewar Chicago: 
his first political activity was putting up posters for Theodore Roosevelt’s Bull 
Moose campaign in 1912, and his master’s thesis drew upon economic writing 
and “the ultimate source of all legal policy, the public,” to develop a test for 
distinguishing between fair and unfair methods of business competition.81 So 
impressed was Northwestern’s dean John Henry Wigmore that he hired the 
learned and witty, young lawyer as a lecturer for the 1916-17 academic year 
and planned to appoint him permanently to the faculty.82 Jousting with law 
students paled before the prospect of battlefield heroics, however. After the 
first semester, Caldwell left for Europe. He served first in the American Field 
Service Ambulance Corps and then in the French Foreign Legion, earning the 
Croix de Guerre for his heroism.83 
When Caldwell returned to Chicago, he chose a position in the law firm 
now known as Kirkland & Ellis over Wigmore’s offer of a professorship.84 
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, was one of 
the firm’s most important clients, and when the Colonel added the radio station 
WGN to his holdings, Caldwell immersed himself in the principles of radio 
engineering.85 He took leave in June 1928 to serve as the first General Counsel 
of the Federal Radio Commission with the understanding that he would resign 
after organizing its Law Department and implementing General Order 40, the 
comprehensive plan to make airwaves safe for high-power, commercial broad-
casters. (Not coincidentally, WGN received a 50,000-watt, clear-channel license 
																																								 																				
79 The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 408. 
80 WHO’S WHO IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL, 1938–39, at 135 (1938). 
81 Public Forum of the Federal Bar Association on Administrative Law and Procedure, 15 
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galegroup.com/apps/doc/BT2310007955/BIC?u=wash43584&sid=BIC&xid=f15d8c03.  
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
422 
during his tenure.)86 After seven months he left to open a Washington office for 
Kirkland & Ellis and was said to have brought $50,000 in retainers to the firm.87 
Caldwell’s reputation grew as he delivered a series of masterful 
summaries of radio engineering, radio legislation, the FRC’s policies and 
procedures in law reviews, congressional testimony, and reports for the ABA’s 
Standing Committee on Communications, which he chaired from 1928 to 
1932.88 At the 1932 convention he suggested that the ABA’s president appoint 
a Special Committee on Administrative Law to regularize rules of practice and 
procedure across administrative agencies. To Caldwell’s surprise and dismay, 
the president agreed, appointed him chair, and asked for a report by the next 
meeting, which, as it happened, convened just after the First Hundred Days of 
the Roosevelt Administration, with its creation of federal agencies with vast 
power over American agriculture and industry.89 The task Caldwell thought 
mattered only to administrative lawyers suddenly thrust him into a political 
maelstrom.  He served with increasing discomfort until 1936, when he resigned 
to organize the Federal Communications Bar Association and become its first 
president.90 He was the bete noire of non-profit broadcasters, but even New 
Dealers respected his ability and integrity and valued his help when Mutual 
joined with the FCC in battling CBS and NBC later in the decade.91 
As Caldwell’s career demonstrated, the ceaseless rounds of applications, 
frequent hearings, and occasional appeals to the courts made radio law a lucra-
tive practice, centered in Washington, DC. Of the 101 lawyers who appeared 
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before the FRC in the early 1930s, 75 had offices in the nation’s capital.92 The 
need for proximity to the Commission lay in the peculiar nature of radio law. 
With other agencies, lawyers could rely on the “law in the books”—statutes, 
regulations, and published opinions—to advise clients with tolerable accuracy. 
At FCC, however, a few statutory provisions and detailed regulations on 
engineering practices addressed some issues, but the ultimate standard for 
awarding licenses was, as a general counsel conceded, “a very elastic 
proposition.”93 The Commission might have revealed its understanding of 
what “the public interest, convenience or necessity” required by writing 
opinions with clear and broad statements of policy. It rarely did. Instead, the 
commissioners juggled a large and shifting number of factors until it found a 
combination that justified their preferred result.94 The technical and financial 
capacity of applicants; their residence, citizenship, and moral character; the 
need for local service in a community; interference with existing stations; the 
content and variety of the programming on the station; a licensee’s broadcast 
of deceptive or excessive advertising; and the extent to which the station 
followed its announced schedule all might factor in a decision—or they might 
not. Because the commissioners never established even “an approximate 
measuring rod,” the public interest, necessity or convenience meant whatever 
“a majority of the Commission wants it to mean,” Caldwell complained.95  
 
In one case, after reciting all the arid details, the Commission 
pronounces the conclusion of the syllogism: “Now, therefore, the 
granting of the application will serve public interest, conven-
ience or necessity.” In another case, decided the same week, an 
equivalent or even more arid lot of details are recited, with a 
contrary conclusion.96  
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Careful students, looking back on the decisions from a considerable 
distance, claimed to detect some patterns but also much that “savored of the 
arbitrary” and the “capricious.”97 
Lawyers at some remove from Washington could not hope to master the 
inchoate tendencies and unarticulated calculations that moved the commissioners, 
even with the help of newsletters and trade journals that regularly reported on 
doings at the FCC. Too much of what lawyers needed to know was too intuitive, 
unverifiable, or even libelous to appear in print. It could only be acquired through 
observation or conversation with other radio lawyers over lunch, at bar gatherings, 
or in the elevators of office buildings. Thus, proximity to the commission or conn-
ections with a Washington insider was necessary for a successful radio practice. 
The best-informed lawyers had once worked for the commission itself. 
“Washington has become the happy hunting ground for former members of the 
FRC legal staff,” complained the editor of a trade journal in 1934.98 The biggest 
game went to the former occupants of one of the FCC’s four statutory positions: 
general counsel (salaried at $10,000 during the FRC years and $9,000 thereafter) 
and three assistant general counsels (salaried at $7,500).99 Of the nine men who 
held these posts at the FRC, only one was still a lawyer at the agency in 1936. A 
second, Thad Brown, had become a commissioner; the other seven were 
admitted to practice before the FCC. All save one had offices in Washington, 
and they represented the most powerful companies in the industry. For example, 
one month in 1933 Duke Patrick was General Counsel; the next he represented 
CBS as a member of the law firm Hogan & Hartson.100 “Almost every time 
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anybody ceased to occupy a position on or with the Federal Radio Commission 
he immediately turned up as the representative of the broadcasting companies,” 
complained Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana in 1935. “It is an extremely 
bad practice, to say the least, for a man to step out of the Federal Radio 
Commission and then go up before it and appear for private clients.”101 
What troubled Wheeler was less the knowledge lawyers took with them 
than the friends they left behind.102 “A man who is down there as an attorney 
gets acquainted with the engineers, gets acquainted with all the help in the 
office,” the Montanan observed. “He then steps out and represents one particular 
firm, or one particular broadcasting station, or one particular chain.”103  His 
friends stay in the agency, “and it is only human nature that people he has 
appointed to office have an interest in him and may, unconsciously perhaps, give 
him an advantage over other practitioners.”104 
The lawyers left behind might also form a ring. In such cases, a top 
lawyer at an agency surrounded himself with cronies and ensured that one 
would replace him when he departed for private practice. In his new role, the 
left-behind crony did favors for his former boss in exchange for kickbacks. The 
crony might stay in power for some time or he might groom his own successor 
and join his former boss in practice. Once established, a ring was exceedingly 
difficult to root out, because those best positioned to detect it––other lawyers 
in private practice––were most vulnerable to retaliation if they struck at the 
ringleader but failed to kill him. 
In the 1935 hearings Wheeler observed that, during the early days of the 
income tax, lawyers who left the Bureau of Internal Revenue got refunds for 
their clients from the friends and appointees they left behind.105 In all likelihood, 
he was referring to The Great Mellon Ring of the 1920s. As soon as he became 
Solicitor of the Bureau in 1925, Alexander Gregg filled its top legal posts with 
close associates. Two years later he resigned and established a lucrative tax 
practice, with clients that included companies owned or controlled by the family 
of U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mellon. Gregg’s assistant Clarence 
Charest succeeded him as Solicitor. Charest, an FBI investigation found, rou-
tinely provided Gregg with special favors and secret information.106 Although 
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thoroughly resented by Washington attorneys, the ring persisted until the change 
of administrations in 1933, when Charest left to join Gregg’s firm.107 
The figure who conjured up The Mellon Ring for Wheeler in the 1935 
hearings was Paul D. P. Spearman.108 “More shrewd than intelligent,” in the 
judgment of a long-serving FCC lawyer, Spearman came to the FRC in 1929 as 
a friend and political ally of his fellow Mississippian Eugene Sykes.109 He quickly 
became Assistant General Counsel and as quickly left to establish a radio 
practice.110 Through the intercession of Mississippi Senator Hubert Stephens, 
Spearman returned to the Commission as General Counsel in July 1934.111 He 
promptly repaid the favor by traveling to his home state with Sykes and another 
FCC lawyer to campaign for Stephens against the demagogue Theodore G. Bilbo 
in a fiercely contested Democratic primary. Bilbo won and avenged himself by 
excoriating Sykes during a hearing.112 Sykes and Spearman weathered Bilbo’s 
blows, but Wheeler was alarmed by the revelations and by Spearman’s hiring of 
a former attorney general of Mississippi as his assistant.113 When Spearman left 
the agency in 1936 to join ex-Senator Stephens’s law firm, he lobbied to have his 
assistant succeed him as General Counsel, but lost when the Texas congressional 
delegation successfully backed Hampson Gary.114 The assistant followed Spearman 
to Stephens’s firm a few months later.115 When rumors soon circulated that certain 
political law firms were demanding tribute from those with business before the 
Commission, no other group of radio lawyers better answered the description.116 
Yet when a scandal broke in the press in early 1937 it involved a different 
group of former FCC lawyers. On February 10, the FCC reprimanded a young 
radio lawyer named George S. Smith, an associate of the former Assistant 
General Counsel Paul M. Segal, for persuading one of the FCC’s secretaries to 
swap an altered set of depositions for one already entered into the Commission’s 
																																								 																				
107 Id.; E. Barrett Prettyman, The Autobiography of an Obscure Man at Forty, in E. BARRETT 
PRETTYMAN PAPERS 241, 243 (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
108 Confirmation of Members, supra note 101, at 39. 
109 Interview of Rosel H. Hyde, supra note 58; Confirmation of Members, supra note 101, at 
44; Dutcher, supra note 40, at 3. 
110 Confirmation of Members, supra note 101, at 36-37. 
111 Id. at 36; Commission Progresses in Task of Organization, TELECOM. REP., Oct. 4, 1934, at 15. 
112 Confirmation of Members, supra note 101, at 1-6, 33-36; Confirmation Inquiry Develops 
Senators’ Opposition to Merger, TELECOM. REP., Jan. 25, 1935, at 11. 
113 Confirmation of Members, supra note 101, at 36-37; Commission Progresses in Task of 
Organization, TELECOM. REP., Oct. 4, 1934, at 15. 
114 Spearman Resigns as FCC General Counsel, TELECOM. REP., Jun. 27, 1935, at 5; Hampson 
Gary Named FCC General Counsel, TELECOM. REP., Jul. 3, 1935, at 4.  
115 Judge Roberson Resigns as FCC Telephone Assistant General Counsel, TELECOM. REP., Dec. 
2, 1935, at 3. 
116 Ward, supra note 76, at 455. 
Vol. 4:3]      The Shallow State 
	
	
427 
files.117 The commissioners intended to give the matter no more publicity 
beyond entering the reprimand in the minutes, but they did not count on one of 
their colleagues, George Henry Payne, who was away on one of his frequent 
Florida vacations.118  Payne had a personal interest in the reputation of Smith and 
Segal, because the two were defending the editor of Broadcasting in Payne’s 
libel suit against the trade journal. When he returned, Payne claimed to have 
more information on the Smith case, demanded the Commission investigate 
further, and leaked word of Smith’s reprimand to the press.119 The widely read 
columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen predicted fireworks within the 
FCC over charges that several lawyers arranged for friendly stenographers to 
alter documents and filed applications on behalf of dummy companies.120 Two 
days later, the columnists revealed that the FCC had commenced disciplinary 
proceedings against Segal and Smith,121 and not long thereafter Payne, acting on 
his own initiative, ordered the distribution of a press release detailing the charges 
against them. As Segal and Smith later complained, 1,400 copies of the press 
release circulated among their clients, radio stations throughout the United 
States, telegraph companies, telephone companies, members of Congress, press 
associations, individual newspapers, and lawyers practicing before the FCC.122 
Not until October 1937 did the FCC finally commence hearings on the 
charges, after first disqualifying Payne, over his outraged protest. For the next 
eight days the other commissioners heard testimony establishing that Segal had 
directed his female stenographers to sign articles of incorporation that hid the 
identity of one client and inflated the wealth of another. But rather than disbar 
the two, the FCC decided in December 1937 that Smith had done nothing 
wrong and that Segal should be suspended from the roll of attorneys for only 
two months. Segal’s standing, character and integrity were of the highest, the 
Commission explained, and he had already lost much business, thanks to the 
cloud under which he had labored since Payne’s press release.123 
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The affair was an embarrassment to the radio bar, not least of all 
because Segal chaired the FCBA’s ethics committee.124 But it also revealed an 
embarrassing shortcoming of the Commission itself: its failure to prevent well-
connected lawyers from selecting, shaping, or even falsifying the factual record 
in proceedings before them. FCBA leaders confessed to Payne that “certain 
men are ruining the profession.”125 They adopted a canon of ethics for the radio 
bar, but they could not by their own efforts guarantee the integrity of the 
Commission’s procedures for gathering evidence and finding facts.126 
 
IV. THE TRIALS OF A REFORM CHAIRMAN 
 
The FCC might have stayed mired in patronage politics, networks 
lobbying, and unethical lawyering indefinitely. Congress was unlikely to drain 
a swamp in which some of its powerful members wallowed happily. The 
President also benefited from discretely making his wishes known. Further, 
during his first term Roosevelt had no great policy requiring a meritocratically 
staffed, efficient, and wieldy FCC. As long as the networks carried his fireside 
chats, an old-line agency sufficed. 
During his second term, however, reforming the FCC struck Roosevelt 
as good politics.  Initially, it allowed him to forestall a potential embarrassing 
investigation headed by a rival Democrat leading the fight in the Senate to 
defeat his plan to “pack” the U.S. Supreme Court. It then helped him counter 
charges that he wanted to use the federal bureaucracy for partisan ends, which 
were prompted by his executive reorganization bill, his intervention into the 
Democratic primaries of 1938, and the misuse of federal relief funds in 
elections that year.127 For assistance, he turned to a network of lawyers, 
economists, and other professionals within his administration.  First among 
these “White House janissaries,”128 “palace politicians,”129 and “downtown 
brain-trusters”130 was Thomas G. Corcoran, a protégé of the Harvard law pro-
fessor Felix Frankfurter who since 1935 had been serving informally as FDR’s 
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assistant.131 Corcoran boasted that his was “a unified command” that “watched 
the affairs of all the administrative agencies.”132 He and his close associate 
Benjamin V. Cohen served as the New Deal’s principal legislative draftsmen 
and consultants to agency lawyers across the administration.133  
President Roosevelt announced his “Court-packing” plan on February 5, 
1937. Within days, Burton Wheeler, who resented Roosevelt for supplanting him 
as the leading progressive in the Democratic Party, emerged as the leader of the 
opposition in the Senate.134 Wheeler’s most sensational thrust came on March 
22, when he read to the Senate Judiciary Committee a letter from Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes demolishing FDR’s argument that the superannuated 
justices were behind in their work.135 Another sally against the president was 
Wheeler’s threat, as Chairman of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, to 
investigate the FCC. On February 12, he announced he was drafting a bill to 
reverse the “very distinct tendency toward monopoly” in the radio industry.136 
The Senate’s acknowledged expert on radio matters, Wallace H. White, soon 
joined in. On March 17, the Maine Republican delivered a major address calling 
for an investigation of the FCC’s role in the trafficking of radio frequencies and 
the networks’ monopolization of the industry. “The light of publicity” would not 
fall solely upon the Commission, White warned. “Every Senator knows that the 
air is full of reports that cases have been decided not alone on the evidence 
presented and the merits of the issue, but that political pressure has often been 
exerted, and that it has been determinative in many instances.”137 
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A Wheeler-led investigation was a most unappealing prospect for the 
president. “The Administration does not want the smells emanating from [the 
FCC] traced to their source,” claimed a contributor to The Nation.138 White 
held his resolution in abeyance until July 6, the first day of Senate debate on 
the Court-packing plan. As promptly and unanimously reported out of the 
Interstate Commerce Committee, it authorized that body to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the radio industry and the FCC. Although further action 
awaited its consideration by the Senate’s audit committee, the measure 
remained a source of great concern. “Scarcely anything pending on Capitol 
Hill worried the President more than Senator Wallace White’s resolution for a 
sweeping Senate investigation of the FCC, particularly because this resolution 
would be handled by the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, of which 
Burton K. Wheeler is chairman,” Business Week reported. “The President 
correctly interprets Wheeler’s attitude as one of active dislike for himself.”139 
One time-tested tactic for forestalling a congressional investigation was 
to name new appointees to a suspect agency and ask that they be given time to 
put matters aright. The tactic was particularly likely to succeed if Congress had 
its own skeletons in the closet. In late May, Roosevelt was handed this 
opportunity when Commissioner Irvin Stewart unexpectedly declined 
reappointment.140 As the Supreme Court fight and a strike wave raged, 
Roosevelt searched for (in an aide’s words) “a strong man” whose appointment 
would quell talk on the Hill about a Congressional investigation.141 What was 
needed, Roosevelt told his son, was someone who would “bring order out of 
chaos” and, although not Chairman, “give life and direction to the whole 
Commission.”142 Then, on July 23, Chairman Prall died at his vacation home 
in Maine and gave Roosevelt an additional opportunity to quiet what a trade 
journal called “the storm of censure and criticism” surrounding the FCC.143  
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For Stewart’s position, he quickly settled on T.A.M. Craven, the 
Commission’s chief engineer.144 The right chairman was a more difficult choice, 
but at last Roosevelt settled on Frank R. McNinch, then serving as Chairman of 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC).145 The diminutive McNinch, a Presby-
terian deacon “much given to such Scriptural injunctions as ‘To your tents, O 
Israel!’” seemed better suited to lead an adult Sunday school class than an agency 
bullied about by politicians, network executives, and the radio bar.146 He also 
suffered from incapacitating bouts of inflammatory colitis.147 And as McNinch 
himself acknowledged, he knew little about radio broadcasting or the FCC.148 
Even so, much argued for his appointment. He had demonstrated his political 
independence by breaking with North Carolina’s Democrats over Alfred Smith’s 
presidential candidacy.149 After Roosevelt made him chairman of the FPC in 
1933, he joined in the New Deal’s crusade against public utility holding companies 
by opposing their attempt to monopolize hydroelectric dam sites.150 McNinch did 
not want to leave the FPC but acceded to Roosevelt’s request with the 
understanding he would return once he “got things in good order at the FCC.”151  
“I am sure your colleagues and the public will expect and welcome 
from you aggressive and fearless leadership,” Roosevelt wrote McNinch on the 
eve of his new chairmanship.152 McNinch told the press that FDR had given 
him “a completely free hand” and that “my judgment and my conscience are 
my only guides.”153 He made a strong start by ending the Broadcast Division’s 
monopoly over the initial granting of licenses and abolishing three notorious 
sinecures, held by a cousin of former Senator Hugo Black, the nephew of 
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147 TELECOM. REP., Sept. 20, 1938, at 3 (McNinch hospitalized for colitis). 
148 Chief Engineer Craven and Federal Power Chairman McNinch Are Appointed to FCC, 
TELECOM. REP., Aug. 17, 1937, at 1. 
149 Frank R. McNinch, Government Aide: Former Chairman of Federal Power and Commun-
ications Commissions Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1950, at 23. 
150 WHO’S WHO IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL, supra note 80, at 583; Frank R. McNinch, supra note 149. 
151 Chief Engineer Craven and Federal Power Chairman McNinch Are Appointed to FCC, 
TELECOM. REP., Aug. 17, 1937, at 1. 
152 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Frank R. McNinch (Sept. 17, 1937), in OF, supra note 37, 
number 1059, box 1. 
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TELECOM. REP., Aug. 17, 1937, at 4. 
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House Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, and a former aide of Postmaster General 
James A. Farley, the New Deal’s chief patronage dispenser.154 
Next McNinch persuaded the commission to record the names and 
addresses of all who contacted its members about licenses and to note the 
substance of the communication. Neither trial examiners nor commissioners were 
to consider the intervention unless the message was made part of the record in a 
hearing.155 “Over a period of years there has grown up, like Topsy, the practice 
of making suggestions, requests or recommendations to members of the Commis-
sion or its staff as to matters pending by those not of record as parties in interest,” 
McNinch explained.156  Congress had established the FCC as an independent 
agency with quasi-judicial powers; it now needed congressmen’s forbearance to 
exercise those powers faithfully.157 But it was not to be; more than a high-minded 
edict was required to break longstanding congressional expectations.158   
The new chairman’s investigations of programming that offended his 
priggish sensibilities did not help his cause. “It seems we must be protected 
against Mae West, invaders from Mars, a little profanity in a Pulitzer prize play, 
too much foreign language, mediocre programs (whatever that means),” Louis 
Caldwell observed, “and a host of other utterances and programs that might 
warp our thirteen-year-old minds.”159 McNinch found particularly offensive a 
sketch broadcasted on NBC, in which Mae West, playing a bored and 
concupiscent Eve in the garden of Eden, fed applesauce to a dull and 
complacent Adam and opened his eyes to her charms. The chairman’s 
censoriousness roiled the commission further, as Payne echoed his outrage and 
Craven objected to second-guessing the networks.160 
																																								 																				
154 FCC, Press Release (Oct. 14, 1937), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A, box 10; 
McNinch Ousts 3 Aids, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1937, at 1. On Farley, see DANIEL SCROOP, MR. 
DEMOCRAT: JIM FARLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS 
103 (2006) (describing Farley’s use of the patronage system throughout his political career). 
155 FCC Order No. 25 (Nov. 11, 1937) in FCC Records, supra note 36, entry 100A, box 10. 
156 FCC Press Release (Nov. 11, 1937), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A, box 10. 
157 Id. 
158 Memorandum on Proposed Reorganization of Federal Communications Commission (S. 
1268) (n.d.), in Wallace H. White Papers, box 64 (on file with the Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, DC). 
159 Caldwell, supra note 95, at 760. Caldwell’s “invaders from Mars” was of course a reference to 
the sensational broadcast of Orson Welles’s “War of the Worlds” on October 30, 1938. See Lee Ann 
Potter, “Jitterbugs” and “Crack-Pots”: Letters to the FCC about the “War of the Worlds” Broad-
cast, 35 PROLOGUE 6 (2003) (giving background on Welles’s famous––and haunting––broadcast). 
160 See generally Radio Script, Chase and Sanborn Hour (Dec. 12, 1937), in President’s 
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Meanwhile, McNinch could not persuade his quarreling commissioners 
to convene promised hearings on networks’ monopolistic practices and news-
paper ownership of radio stations. After congressmen renewed their calls for 
an investigation, Payne went before the House Rules Committee to accuse his 
fellow commissioners of yielding to “outside pressure.”161  He also blasted the 
radio bar for being “in the habit of commanding rather than asking or 
pleading.”162 McNinch publicly demanded that Payne produce evidence to 
back up his charges.163 Journalists lumped the “feud-racked Federal Comm-
unications Commission” together with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
and the National Bituminous Coal Commission, where unseemly in-fighting 
was also on public display.164 “There is not in Washington now and there 
perhaps has never been a commission which was a more grotesque travesty on 
Government regulation than the Communications Commission,” declared a 
correspondent for the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain in June 1938.165 
 
V. THE PURGE 
 
At other agencies, New Dealers used legal divisions to police potentially 
wayward administrators. At the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), 
for example, General Counsel Jerome Frank insisted that food processors not use 
marketing agreements to mulct the public.166 Politicians impatient for federal 
funds railed against the punctiliousness of lawyers at the Public Works Admin-
istration, “fellows who come here to get law jobs in the departments and then sit 
down and look for semicolons and hold up the works.”167 Lawyers at the Social 
Security Board tried to get local administrators to see the recipients of family 
support payments as rights-bearers instead of supplicants.168 At the Bituminous 
Coal Division of the Department of the Interior, General Counsel Abe Fortas 
																																								 																				
A. M. Craven taken at Washington D.C. (May 21 to Jun. 28, 1943), at 49–50, in COX 
COMMITTEE RECORDS, supra note 118, Witness Statements, box 2. 
161 George Henry Payne, Is America’s Radio Industry Controlled by a Monopoly? 17 
CONGRESSIONAL DIG. 313 (1938). 
162 Id. 
163 FCC Influenced by Radio Lobby, Payne Charges, WASH. POST, Jun. 3, 1938, at X3. 
164 Payne Charges his Colleagues Oppose Investigation of FCC, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1938, at X1. 
165 John T. Flynn, Is America’s Radio Industry Controlled by a Monopoly? 17 CONGRESS-
IONAL DIG. 308 (1938). 
166 IRONS, supra note 9, at 118–32. 
167 Shovels Halted by Typewriters, Says La Guardia, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1935, at 6. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt chose Harold Ickes, his Secretary of the Interior, to head the Public Works 
Administration because he knew of the Progressive Republican’s opposition to pork-barrel 
spending in Chicago. SMITH, supra note 9. 
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hired a team of able lawyers, including the future federal judge Harold Leven-
thal, to straighten out the New Deal’s coal policy.169 At the Board of Economic 
Warfare, lawyers required that contracts for material procured overseas include 
clauses mandating decent working conditions for laborers.170 
 At the start of his chairmanship, McNinch had no such ally in the 
FCC’s Law Department. The general counsel he inherited, Hampson Gary, was 
“known to be incompetent at the time of his appointment, just another example 
of political hack placement from which the FCC has suffered.”171 Gary’s three 
assistant general counsels were also political appointees. The lawyers below 
them had mostly acquired their jobs as had their counterparts at other “old line” 
agencies, through the influence of congressional patronage or promotion from 
a clerical position once they earned a degree from one of the many law schools 
in the nation’s capital.172 Many spent most or all of their careers at FCC. 
Fanney Neyman, the FCC’s first female lawyer, for example, had initially 
come to Washington from Montana to clerk in her Senator’s congressional 
office.173  After further legal study at the George Washington University—she 
was already a graduate of the Silver Bow Law College in Butte—she joined 
the FRC’s legal staff in December 1928 and remained at the commission until 
1955.174 Another long-serving lawyer was Rosel Hyde. A Mormon and a 
																																								 																				
169 KALMAN, supra note 9, at 68–70. 
170 Daniel R. Ernst, The Ideal and the Actual in the State: Willard Hurst and the Board of 
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II 150 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew, eds., 2002).  
171 Letter from Anonymous to Thomas G. Corcoran (Dec. 7, 1938), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra 
note 8, box 250. 
172 Two of the New Deal’s first appointments to the FRC suggested the influence of Southern 
Democrats: a judge of the juvenile court of DeKalb County, Georgia, and the former secretary to 
Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-TN). Press Release (Jun. 22, 1933), in FCC RECORDS, supra note 
36. An exception to norm was Carl Wheat, appointed at Felix Frankfurter’s urging to improve the 
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Carl I. Wheat, Telephone Rate Counsel (Jan. 31, 1938), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 
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We Should Distribute the Lawyers, supra note 7, at 5.  
173 Transcript of Hearings, Cox Committee, 7338, in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A, 
box 24. 
174 Id. at 7338-7339; Report of the 1955 Luncheon Committee, 15 FED. COMM. B.J. 57 (1956). 
Female agency lawyers at other agencies also tended to stay in government rather than rotate into 
the private sector because of the difficulty of acquiring clients. Private practice might had been a 
particularly daunting prospect for Neyman and other women in the FCC’s Law Department, as 
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FCBA’s charter members was Mabel Walker Willebrandt, a former U.S. assistant attorney general, 
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Republican, Hyde had come to Washington from Utah in the 1920s to clerk in 
government agencies while taking undergraduate and law classes at George 
Washington University.175 He started at the FRC in 1928 as a disbursing clerk 
but found the job so undemanding that he volunteered for the general counsel, 
whose office was next door. He joined the legal staff after passing the bar.176 
Thanks to the civil service status he held from his original appointment as a 
clerk, he was only demoted and not fired when Democrats took control of the 
commission in 1933.177 Even well-pedigreed New Dealers would come to 
respect him for his intelligence, dedication, and honesty.178 
Such career lawyers performed the FCC’s routine legal work well but 
could scarcely be expected to mount a sustained campaign to clean up the 
agency. McNinch needed to make a change at the top of the Law Department. 
He acquired grounds for ousting Gary when his lawyers’ missteps resulted in 
a string of reversals by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
The most embarrassing was Saginaw Broadcasting decided in March 1938.179  
Writing for a three-judge panel, Harold Stephens showed that the FCC 
commissioners had not carefully read the trial examiner’s report, lectured them 
on the proper way to find facts, scolded them for employing “Star Chamber 
methods,” and urged them to do “justice . . . according to facts and law” rather 
than “extralegal considerations.”180 A journalist translated: the judges believed 
that by awarding a license to a member of the Democratic National Committee 
																																								 																				
who could hold her own in Washington legal circles. BULL. FED. COMM. BAR ASS’N, Dec. 7, 1936, 
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Sept. 21, 1969, at 81. 
176 Interview of Rosel H. Hyde (Mar. 22, 1973), Rosel H. Hyde in INSPIRE RECORDS, box 
2 (on file with Special Collections, Hornbake Library, University of Maryland, College Park, 
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177 Id. at 2. 
178 Interview of Joseph M. Kittner by author (Sept. 2005) (on file with the author). Harry 
Truman appointed Hyde to the Commission and Dwight Eisenhower made him chairman but 
then demoted him after he refused to purge the legal staff of Democrats. Lyndon Johnson 
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179 Missouri Broad. Corp. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm., 94 F.2d 623 (1937); Heitmeyer v. Fed. 
Commc’n Comm., 95 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Saginaw Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n 
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180 Saginaw Broad. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm. 96 F.2d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Roscoe 
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warning against the dangers of “administrative absolutism.” Report of the Special Committee 
on Administrative Law, 63 A.B.A. REP. 358, 359 (1938). 
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against the recommendation of a trial examiner, the FCC had succumbed to 
“political influence and the like.”181 
During the summer of 1938, McNinch tried to dislodge Gary with 
offers of well-paying jobs elsewhere, but the general counsel would not 
budge.182 Finally, in October, after a prolonged absence, McNinch returned to 
the commission with the votes he needed to mount a purge. A majority of the 
commissioners fired Gary for “inefficiency and lack of administrative ability” 
and replaced him with William J. Dempsey, an assistant general counsel at 
McNinch’s FPC and part of Corcoran’s network of lawyers.183 (A dissenting 
commissioner later testified that Corcoran had called him at home to say that 
Roosevelt wanted him to vote against Gary and for Dempsey.)184 Dempsey, in 
turn, installed as his right hand man, William Koplovitz, a cum laude Harvard 
law graduate and his assistant at FPC.185 
Other changes targeted the agency’s trial examiners, the quasi-judicial 
officers who presided over hearings and whose recommendations the full 
commission usually adopted.186 A researcher for the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure concluded that the FCC’s trial 
examiners reached their conclusions not so much on the facts as on their guess 
as to the Commission’s probable decision, which mostly turned on which 
applicant had the best political connections. Some trial examiners were said to 
favor particular members of the radio bar and let them write their reports.187 To 
end such abuses, the FCC, by a 4-3 vote, abolished the trial examiner’s 
																																								 																				
181 Newspaper Ownership Is Held No Bar to Broadcast Gains, BROADCASTING, Apr. 1, 1938, 
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department, fired the chief trial examiner and one of his subordinates, and 
transferred the remaining six trial examiners into the Law Department.188 
Henceforth, one FCC lawyer would preside over a hearing, after which the 
parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions. A single commissioner, 
after reviewing reports from the staff and the presiding lawyer, would 
recommend a disposition to the full commission, which itself then issued the 
proposed findings and conclusions previously produced by the presiding 
lawyer. The parties could file exceptions and request oral argument, after 
which the commission issued its final order.189 Caldwell protested that, as a 
practical matter, the memorandum prepared by the presiding lawyer disposed 
of most cases, but the new procedure closely tracked a safe harbor Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes had identified in a leading case, and it survived until the 
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.190 
 
VI. AN OLD-LINE LAW DEPARTMENT 
 
McNinch boasted that the FCC was finally “going to town,”191 but it 
would not get very far without “the bright New Deal boys” who elsewhere 
supplied administrators with strategic intelligence.192 Three obstacles ham-
pered Dempsey and Koplovitz’s attempts to hire them. The first was a rule 
banning FCC lawyers from its roll of attorneys for two years after they left the 
agency. The second was the civil service status of most FCC lawyers. The third 
was the solicitude of congressional patrons for their constituents in the Law 
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Department. The first obstacle was the agency’s own doing and easily undone, 
but the other two plagued the FCC throughout McNinch’s chairmanship. 
Until the summer of 1935, the commission’s lawyers, like those 
elsewhere in the federal government, were free to leave and represent private 
clients before their former agency as long as they did not do so in any claim 
against the United States pending while they worked there.193  Less than a month 
after Burton Wheeler denounced the revolving door at joint confirmation 
hearings for the new commissioners, the FCC unanimously agreed that no 
lawyer could present clients in any cause before the FCC for two years after 
leaving the Law Department.194 Paul Spearman got out before the effective date, 
but Gary, other FCC lawyers, and any new hires were bound by the rule.195 
The two-year ban had an unintended consequence: it discouraged legal 
recruits who did not envision spending their whole careers at FCC from taking 
a job there. The problem surfaced when Felix Frankfurter urged James Landis, 
newly appointed chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
to adopt a comparable rule for its lawyers.  Landis replied that such a ban would 
keep the SEC from hiring lawyers as good as those in corporate law firms. “We 
are in a different position than Communications,” Landis explained, “and when 
I look at some of their lawyers I shudder.”196 Evidently Dempsey shuddered, 
too. He persuaded the commissioners to drop the ban in November 1938.197  
A second obstacle was also of relatively recent origin. General counsels 
at the FRC, as in most other federal agencies, had been free to hire and fire 
lawyers without regard for the elaborate procedures of the U.S. Civil Service 
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Commission.198 In contrast, the few general counsels with legal staffs within 
the classified civil service could fire subordinates only for cause, a standard 
that, as interpreted by civil service officials, the New Deal lawyers despaired 
of meeting. Hiring procedures were even more constraining. Under them, 
agencies were to notify the Civil Service Commission of open positions. The 
Commission then announced the vacancies to law schools, bar associations, 
state and municipal governments, newspapers, and post offices. Applicants 
were directed to describe their educational background and professional career, 
give references, and sit for a written examination. Prepared and graded by the 
Civil Service Commission’s small staff of legal examiners, the exams quizzed 
applicants on basic common-law subjects rather than relevant statutes or 
administrative law. All who received a passing grade (70 out of 100) were 
placed, in rank order, on a closed register, which the general counsel was not 
allowed to consult. Under “the rule of three,” the Civil Service Commission 
sent over the names and files of the three highest-ranked “eligibles” on the 
register. A general counsel might try to persuade the Commission that none of 
the three would do, but if he did, he could then choose only from among the 
next three highest eligibles.199 
Two other rules also blocked young Ivy league graduates from legal 
positions in the classified legal service. First, veterans and in some cases their 
spouses received extra points on the exam. Able-bodied veterans received an 
extra five points and disabled veterans received ten points. Widows of veterans 
and the wives of disabled veterans also received ten points. An able-bodied 
veteran, therefore, needed only a score of 65 to pass a written examination, 
while a disabled veteran or a widow needed only 60. In addition, any holder of 
a ten-point preference with a passing score jumped to the top of the list. Thus, 
a ten-point preference holder with a score as low as 60 was not only eligible 
for appointment; the Civil Service Commission would certify him or her before 
all competitors lacking the preference, regardless of the others’ scores.200 
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A second political constraint was geographic. Eligibles from any state 
or the District of Columbia with more than its share of appointments went to 
the foot of a register, with the exception of holders of the veterans’ preference, 
who stayed where they were. Not until all the eligibles from the under-
represented states were certified would the Commission proceed to the 
eligibles from one of the overrepresented states. Maryland, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia invariably were overrepresented. They might be joined 
by as many as fifteen other states, depending upon the constantly changing 
balance of hires and separations throughout the entire civil service. In most 
years, a Californian with a score of 70 would be certified before a Virginian 
with a perfect score.201 
Not surprisingly, general counsels at the new agencies insisted that 
their lawyers be outside the classified civil service.202 Several expressed their 
revulsion to its procedures at a meeting of chief legal officers later in the 
decade. “No man wants to be dependent upon Civil Service Commission for 
the selection of individuals for a job,” an unidentified attendee declared.  
Another volunteered that no one present would “hire at any price” many who 
managed to pass the Commission’s exam. “We want lawyers that will go to bat 
for our program,” a third fumed. You “cannot determine that by an 
examination.”203 
In 1934 the FRC was in such ill repute that Congress ignored such 
concerns and provided that in the new FCC only the general counsel, three 
assistant general counsels, and temporary counsel hired for the performance of 
special services would be outside the classified civil service. All other legal 
positions would be filled in accordance with the civil-service laws or the 
Classification Act of 1923.204 Thus, when the FCC sought to hire new lawyers 
in 1935, the Civil Service Commission compiled registers using its standard 
procedures. The first thirty-three positions on the register for junior attorneys 
went to disabled veterans, of whom ten would have received a failing score but 
for the ten-point preference. Other veterans took the next three places. The 
candidate with the highest score on the exam (99.75) was thirty-seventh on the 
register. Holders of the ten-point disability preference claimed the first three 
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spots for a senior attorney position, the first fourteen spots for an attorney 
position, and the first sixty-eight for an assistant attorney position.205 
On that occasion the FCC circumvented the registers by making 
temporary appointments and obtaining an executive order making them 
permanent.206 This dodge was not easily repeated, however, and so McNinch 
asked the Civil Service Commission to reconsider its interpretation that the 
Communications Act of 1934 in fact subjected FCC lawyers to its procedures. 
Unsurprisingly, the civil service commissioners declined to join in what a 
political columnist characterized as Corcoran’s attempt to find berths for “all 
his cronies from Harvard.”207 Dempsey and Koplovitz had an exemption 
written into legislation pending before Congress, but the bill never escaped 
committee.208 The pair were “ready to quit in despair,” presidential assistant 
James Rowe reported to Corcoran in January 1939, because, Rowe claimed, 
like all lawyers under the civil service, the FCC’s would not work past 4:30.209 
A third obstacle to building a New Deal legal division was the 
expectation of influential congressmen that the four best-paying legal 
positions—the general counsel and three assistant general counsels—would be 
filled by patronage appointees. Dempsey and Koplovitz’s selection as general 
counsel and assistant general counsel in charge of the Law Department’s 
Litigation and Administration Division bucked the trend, but patronage 
appointees headed two other divisions throughout McNinch’s chairmanship. 
George Porter was in charge of the large and politically sensitive Broadcast 
Division. The son of a well-connected member of the ICC, he had worked at 
the agency since 1931 and developed close relations with the radio bar. 
Although Telford Taylor, Dempsey’s successor as general counsel, thought 
Porter not without ability, he also considered him “not a very energetic 
lawyer.” Another FCC lawyer described him as “what you’d call a ‘good 
fellow.’”210 James A. Kennedy, in charge of the Common Carriers Division, 
																																								 																				
205 Vipond, supra note 200, at 67–72. 
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was among the temporary appointees of 1934 made permanent by executive 
order. The worst Taylor would say about him on the record was that he was 
“not terribly imaginative,” but the South Carolinian was probably the “rather 
senior lawyer” Taylor later identified as the appointee of Senators from a 
Southern state. “[H]e was largely useless,” Taylor explained, “but it was just 
very well known that if you didn’t keep him on his job there, all hell would 
break loose with a couple of important Senators whose votes were of some 
importance on legislation and appropriation.”211 
 
VII. STALEMATE 
 
Even if McNinch had had a solid phalanx of lawyers behind him, he 
probably could not have pushed the FCC out of its swamp after the October 
1938 purge. Quarrels among the commissioners over censorship, newspaper 
ownership of radio licenses, and regulating the networks spilled into public 
view and produced embarrassing reportage on the “dissension-wracked” 
FCC.212 Further, as Rowe reported to the president’s secretary in January 1939, 
McNinch was “a very sick man.”213 That his ravaged bowels severely limited 
his activity soon became common knowledge.214 
Corcoran urged Roosevelt to act. “Someone is going to make a proposal 
to reorganize the Commissions,” Corcoran told Roosevelt after meeting with 
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Senator Wheeler. “You should get the political credit for the courage of being 
the first to and demand the cleaning up of the mess” at FCC. If Wheeler 
moved before Roosevelt did, he would get the credit, because Commissioner 
“Payne and the publicists on the other side are much cleverer than the people 
on your side.”215  
Roosevelt needed little convincing: in the midst of McNinch’s purge he 
laughingly told Postmaster General James Farley that the FCC commissioners 
were “crazy” and that he would be delighted if they all resigned.216 In a January 
24th press conference, he said the administration was studying legislation to 
restructure the agency.217 Although he refused to discuss which of several new 
blueprints he preferred, one was reportedly a bill drafted by Corcoran and Cohen to 
break up the FCC into a policymaking bureau situated within the Commerce Depart-
ment and an independent quasi-judicial board like the Board of Tax Appeals.218 
Such legislation was unlikely to pass, as congressional leaders, alarmed by the 
misuse of relief funds in the elections of 1938, would have balked at conferring 
so much patronage to a department under the president’s direct control.219 
What did emerge was, in the parlance of the day, a “ripper bill,” a law 
intended to remove officials by replacing an existing agency with a new one.220 
Dempsey and Rowe wrote it one evening after Roosevelt and McNinch “had 
conferred in desperation over the mess the Commission was in.”221 It would 
replace the seven-member FCC with a three-member body and give its 
chairman the power to hire and fire staff.222 Although Wheeler announced his 
support and introduced it into the Senate, he then let it languish. “This was not 
																																								 																				
215 Memorandum from Thomas G. Corcoran, White House Aide, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
President (Jan. 23, 1939), in CORCORAN PAPERS, supra note 8, box 210. 
216 James A. Farley, Memoir (Oct. 14, 1938) (unpublished manuscript), in JAMES A. FARLEY 
PAPERS, box 41 (on file with the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 6, 1941), in ROWE PAPERS, supra note 213, box 13. 
222 S. 1268, 76th Cong. (1939). 
 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
444 
only because of his general attitude toward the President,” Rowe reported to 
the White House, but also because Wheeler “was attempting to trade” inaction 
on the radio bill for support of his investigation of railroad finances.223 
Presumably his trading partner was the Republican Wallace White, who 
objected that Wheeler’s bill would practically “vest in one man authority over 
the vast communications interests of the country.”224 White introduced his own 
bill to create an eleven-member commission, but lobbyists for the National 
Association of Broadcasters kept both measures in committee.225 
As the Wheeler and White bills stalled, a different way to reform the 
FCC presented itself. In March 1939, Judge Sykes unexpectedly announced his 
resignation.226 It was said that “internal friction” had finally grown too great 
for “the ‘father-confessor’ of the FCC,” although perhaps Sykes wished to 
avoid the attention a report on chain monopolies would bring to his support of 
the networks.227 McNinch’s colonitis had worsened, making Corcoran, it was 
said, “the real FCC boss.”228 The infirm chairman was sure to resign once his 
successor was named.229 With the term of a third commissioner up in July, 
FDR could remake the Commission and again forestall a congressional 
investigation.230 
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This time Roosevelt needed a stronger chairman than Frank McNinch. 
He would have to have the antimonopoly credentials to satisfy Burton Wheeler, 
the political shrewdness to maneuver in a thoroughly partisan environment, 
and the toughness to stand up to attacks from the broadcast networks’ well-
financed lobbyists. Even then, the chairman would probably fail unless he had 
a strong and dedicated legal staff that could ensure the accuracy of the 
Commission’s records and the fidelity of the staff to the Commission’s new 
policies. As it happened, Corcoran knew just the man.231 
 
VIII. A NEW DEAL FOR THE FCC 
 
The New Deal finally came to radio on September 1, 1939, the day 
Germany invaded Poland and James Lawrence Fly became chairman of the 
FCC. “Larry” Fly was born in 1898 into a rural community outside Dallas and 
a network of politically active cousins scattered across the Upper South, all 
descended from an adventurer who landed in Virginia in 1636.232 He graduated 
from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1920, served in the Atlantic Fleet until 1923, 
and then attended the Harvard Law School, graduating in 1926 with a B 
average and the regard of Thomas G. Corcoran, who delighted in the Texan’s 
tales of naval adventure.233 Fly worked for a time at a Wall Street law firm but 
then joined the antitrust staff of Herbert Hoover’s Department of Justice.234 
Although he labored mightily to succeed his boss John Lord O’Brian after 
Roosevelt’s inauguration, the post went to a better connected but less able 
Democrat. Never one to defer to those he did not respect—J. Edgar Hoover 
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complained that the young lawyer had told an FBI agent that someone should 
“take me up a dark alley some night and give me the proper treatment, but that 
this event would never happen because I never went out alone”—Fly sought a 
job in one of the new agencies.235 With Corcoran’s help, he became General 
Counsel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, where he acquired a reputation as 
one of the New Deal’s toughest and most effective lawyers.236 A second bid to 
be Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division in 1938 fell short 
when the job went to Thurman W. Arnold, but the following year Corcoran 
convinced Roosevelt that Fly was “the best man available” for the 
chairmanship of the FCC.237 
 Telford Taylor, whom Fly would soon hire as General Counsel, 
considered him the FCC’s “first really able chairman,” who set the 
Commission “on its feet and gave it a prestige and a reputation for being up 
and coming and grappling with problems that nobody’d ever done.”238 He 
could be very charming but also “very dominant and overbearing, if he chose 
to be.”239 He could “appear to lose his temper without really losing it—a very 
useful quality to have.”240 Another FCC lawyer remembered him as “brilliant, 
tough, honorable, and irascible”;241 others considered him “a fearsome guy,” 
hard on all the lawyers appearing before the Commission but especially on his 
own.242 Even so, his lawyers were proud of their work at Fly’s FCC, which 
they recalled as a period of “great activity, lots of pressures, and a pretty deft 
handling of the various problems as they arose from minute to minute and day 
to day . . . .”243 Paul Porter, CBS’s lawyer and then Fly’s successor, claimed 
the staff had “a kind of fierce faith in what Larry Fly was doing.”244 
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Even before taking office, Fly found ways to get FCC lawyers out from 
under the Civil Service.245 For example, the Communications Act allowed each 
commissioner to hire a secretary without regard to the civil service rules.246 For 
his, Fly chose Nathan David, a magna cum laude graduate of Yale College 
who finished fourth in his class at the Harvard Law School.247 Because the 
Civil Service Commission’s registers for FCC lawyers were five years old, Fly 
repeated the dodge of hiring junior lawyers on a temporary basis until an 
executive order in 1941 changed the status of lawyers across the federal 
government.248 One way or another, Marcus Cohen (Chicago J.D. 1938, 
Harvard LL.M. 1940), Philip Elman (Harvard LL.B. 1939), Thomas Harris 
(Columbia LL.B. 1935), David Lloyd (Harvard LL.B. 1935), Lucien Hilmer 
(Harvard LL.B. 1931), Leo Resnick (Columbia LL.B. 1937), and Oscar 
Schachter (Columbia LL.B. 1939) were at work by the end of June 1940, albeit 
only after their appointments had been staggered so as not to confront the 
commissioners with too many Jewish surnames at once.249 Although they 
thought of themselves as a “new breed of lawyer,” their kind had staffed other 
alphabet agencies since the start of the New Deal.250 
Fly also made changes at the top of the Law Department. Dempsey and 
Koplovitz left in April 1940.251 On Corcoran’s recommendation, Fly named 
Telford Taylor as General Counsel.252 The thirty-two-year-old had been an 
editor of the Harvard Law Review, clerked for the federal judge Augustus 
Hand, served on Jerome Frank’s legal staff at AAA, and helped Corcoran and 
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Cohen draft the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.253 He was stuck in a 
tedious investigation of railroads’ financial practices headed by Burton 
Wheeler when the FCC job provided an escape.254 To take Koplovitz’s place 
as “first” Assistant General Counsel, charged with resolving difficult legal 
questions and clarifying matters of policy, Taylor chose Joseph Rauh, who had 
led his class at the Harvard Law School, clerked for Cardozo and Frankfurter, 
helped Corcoran and Cohen defend the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 
and worked at the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.255 
Rauh had very able lieutenants in Harry Plotkin (Harvard LL.B. 1937), 
Schachter, and a third recruit, Seymour Krieger (Yale LL.B. 1938), who did 
much of the work on a long-awaited report on the monopoly power of 
broadcast networks.256 Philip Elman, assigned to the Broadcast Division while 
																																								 																				
253 FCC, Press Release, Telford Taylor Appointed General Counsel (May 6, 1940); The Remini-
scences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 181, 183 in FCC Records, supra note 36, entry 100A, 
box 9. 
254 The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 197–201, 367–70; Letter from Felix 
Frankfurter to Telford Taylor (Jan. 29, 1937), in FF-LC, supra note 196, reel 65. FCC, Press 
Release, Telford Taylor Appointed General Counsel (May 6, 1940) (announcing Telford Taylor’s 
appointment to the General Counsel position at the FCC and describing his prior legal experience) 
in FCC RECORDS, supra note 36, entry 100A, box 9; The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra 
note 36, at 181, 183, 197–201, 367–70; (discussing Taylor’s role in drafting the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 and his later entrance into the FCC); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Telford Taylor (Jan. 29, 1937), in FF-LC, supra note 196, reel 65 (relating Frankfurter’s 
impression of the uniquely complicated case Telford was working on). Taylor is perhaps best 
known as the chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg after 1945. Jonathan A. Bush, Telford 
Taylor, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 539–40 (Roger K. Newman 
ed., 2009) (describing the trajectory of Taylor’s career). 
255 MICHAEL E. PARRISH, CITIZEN RAUH: AN AMERICAN LIBERAL’S LIFE IN LAW AND POLITICS 
18–52 (2010) (delineating Joseph Rauh’s life starting at childhood through his time as a 
Washington lawyer); The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 369–70 (reflecting 
on the decision-making process in Rauh’s appointment to Deputy Assistant General Counsel).  
256 See The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 390–91, 419 (contrasting the 
youthful makeup and personality of the section with the “old-line civil servants . . . in the other two 
sections”); The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 211, at 15 (discussing the team that 
jointly wrote FCC regulations); The Reminiscences of Joseph L. Rauh, supra note 241, at 9-10 
(recalling his time working with colleague Seymour Krieger); MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREC-
TORY, supra note 249, at 341 (listing Seymour Krieger and his educational history). Dempsey had 
somehow managed to hire Plotkin and another very able lawyer, Benedict Cottone, to assist 
Koplovitz. Telford Taylor thought Plotkin “much the brighter” and Cottone “the more steady in an 
administrative way” and kept both on. The Reminiscences of Telford Taylor, supra note 36, at 390; 
Lawyer Harry Plotkin Dies; Argued “Seven Dirty Words” Case, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 1998), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/01/31/lawyer-harry-plotkin-dies/74797cc2-
052c-4b88-b5f9-94c6c2fbcb24/; Cottone, FCC Attorney with Experience in Other Agencies, Is 
Leading Possibility To Be Assistant General Counsel, TELECOM. REP. 4 (Jun. 12, 1941) (announcing 
Benedict Cottone as the probable leading candidate for the assistant general counsel position).  
Vol. 4:3]      The Shallow State 
	
	
449 
awaiting a clerkship with Justice Frankfurter, dispatched his assignments so 
quickly that he had plenty of time to complete “odd jobs for Joe Rauh,” 
including researching Roosevelt’s speeches.257 Taylor installed his college and 
law school classmate Lucien Hilmer as Assistant General Counsel in charge of 
the Broadcast Division in the summer of 1940 and replaced the politically well-
fortified Kennedy with Benedict Cottone (Yale LL.B. 1933) atop the Tele-
phone Division the following year.258 
 Thanks to what Cottone called this “great infusion of new blood,” the 
Law Department became the vanguard of an ambitious and aggressive FCC.259 
Fly believed his agency “should deal with the big and the fundamental things,” 
one of his lawyers recalled. “[T]he little licensee who did something or didn’t 
do something, carried too many commercial spot announcements or didn’t 
carry enough public service programs—so what?”260 Thus, although Fly 
redesigned the hearing room to make it more court-like and created an 
investigation unit to check up on radio lawyers’ dubious factual claims, his 
commission also lengthened the duration of licenses to a year and dispensed 
with hearings for renewals and transfers.261 
 The streamlining of licensing procedures allowed Fly to concentrate on 
more sweeping measures. His principal concern at the start of his chairmanship 
was the monopolization of the airwaves.262 The Communications Act of 1934 
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Operating Companies, TELECOM. REP., Jun. 4, 1941, at 6. 
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261 FCC Hearing Room Undergoes Streamlining, WASH. EVENING STAR, Nov. 4, 1939, at A-4 
(de-scribing the changes Fly made to the hearing room to make it more like a court room, which 
included the removal of desks, the addition of a long curved bench, and the placement of 
soundproof material on the ceilings); FCC Sets Up Investigation Unit Under David Lloyd, NAB 
REP., Jul. 26, 1940, in FLY PAPERS, supra note 232, box 30 (providing Fly’s reasoning for creating 
an investigation unit at the FCC); The Reminiscences of Lucien Hilmer, supra note 258, at 11 
(noting the “serious doubts as to the propriety of renewing the licenses of” several stations); 
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atives, 77th Cong., 779 (1942). 
262 Another battle was his successful opposition to RCA’s premature bid to impose standards 
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kept radio broadcasters subject to federal antitrust laws, but that had not 
prevented CBS and NBC from controlling 87 percent of night-time radio 
broadcasting.263 From November 1938 to May 1939, McNinch’s FCC held 
seventy-three days of hearings on chain monopoly at which ninety-six 
witnesses testified, but it promulgated no rules during his tenure.264 Paul Porter 
dismissed the hearings as “a lot of self-serving declarations and economic 
information.”265 In contrast, the Report on Chain Broadcasting, issued on May 
2, 1941, hit hard. As Fly explained in a memo to the White House, “[t]wo men 
([NBC’s David] Sarnoff and [CBS’s William] Paley) can say what more than 
half of the people may or may not hear. . . . Democracy cannot rest upon so 
frail a reed.”266 The report required NBC to sell one of its two networks, 
reduced the maximum length of affiliation contracts, and limited “option time,” 
claimed by networks for their own programming. The networks won a 
concession on option time but still fought the rules all the way up to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.267 There the FCC ultimately prevailed, in an opinion by Justice 
Felix Frankfurter.268 
																																								 																				
Corporation of America was attempting to achieve a monopoly by failing to include a 
warning in advertisements of possible obsolescence); SUSAN L. BRINSON, THE RED SCARE, 
POLITICS, AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1941–1960, at 36–40 (2004) 
(explaining the context behind the FCC’s refusal to establish transmission standards for 
television in 1940). 
263 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 313, 48 Stat. 1064, 1087 (1934); 
Mickie Edwardson, James Lawrence Fly's Report on Chain Broadcasting (1941) and the 
Regulation of Monopoly in America, 22 HIST. J. FILM, RADIO & TELEVISION 397, 410 (2002) 
(“Fly said the large networks competed with each other only weakly and robbed stations of 
freedom over programming. ‘Two New York corporations’, he said, controlled 86.6% of 
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264 Edwardson, supra note 263, at 399. 
265 The Reminiscences of Paul Aldermandt Porter, supra note 244, at 27. 
266 Memorandum on Radio Broadcasting Monopoly from James Lawrence Fly to Harry S. 
Truman, President (May 5, 1941), in ROWE PAPERS, supra note 202. 
267 See Edwardson, supra note 263, at 411 (discussing the three ways in which the FCC 
softened the rules in October 1941 after listening to networks’ objections the prior summer); 
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1933–1953, at 168–74 (1968) (explaining the struggle between networks and the government 
fought between 1941 and 1943); VICTOR W. PICKARD, AMERICA’S BATTLE FOR MEDIA 
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REFORM 51–55 (2015) (exploring the fallout following the release of the Report on Chain 
Broadcasting). 
268 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Earlier, Frankfurter invited Fly to 
engage in “unfettered exchange” about the FCC. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to James Lawrence 
Fly, Jun. 3, 1940, in FLY PAPERS, supra note 232, box 1. Fly sent the Justice a copy of the chain 
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May 27, 1941, in id. A retrospective blamed poor enforcement by Fly’s successors for their 
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Fly also deftly handled a presidential desire with authoritarian over-
tones. Newspaper ownership of radio stations grew dramatically during the 
1930s, from 6 percent in 1930 to 31 percent in 1939.269 In nearly 100 locales, 
a newspaper owned the only radio station.270 Meanwhile, Roosevelt became 
convinced that most newspaper publishers were arrayed against him. Only 41 
percent of daily newspapers editorialized in favor of his election in 1932, only 
37 percent did in 1936, and only 25 percent did in 1940.271 He found newspaper 
coverage of the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and 
other legislative landmarks of 1935 particularly galling. After his reelection, 
he apparently had his aides inform the FCC of his opposition when a newspaper 
he considered an egregious culprit applied for a license.272 In early 1939, his 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a member of an increasingly vocal anti-
monopoly faction within the administration, attacked the press as “America’s 
House of Lords.”273 And in May 1939, Roosevelt himself released an inter-
view in which he attacked newspapers and declared that “only through the 
radio is it possible to overtake loudly proclaimed truths or greatly exaggerated 
half truths.”274 
Neither the FCC nor Congress rushed to support him. In January 1937, 
then-General Counsel Hampson Gary opined that the FCC lacked the power to 
adopt a ban under the Communications Act of 1934.275 A pro-administration 
congressman promptly introduced a bill forbidding newspaper and magazine 
publishers from owning radio stations, but neither that measure nor a similar 
bill introduced in 1939 escaped committee.276 
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Hampson Gary’s memorandum to Montana Senator Burton Wheeler on expanding the 
FCC’s power under the Communications Act of 1934) . 
276 See H.R. Res. 3892, 75th Cong. (1937); STAMM, supra note 52, at 98–99. 
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Roosevelt, it seems clear, expected Fly to act without waiting for 
Congress. As reported years later by Rowe, Fly claimed that Roosevelt had asked 
him to pursue a ban, even though the president could not back him publicly. If 
Fly “got in trouble,” he would be on his own.277 But Fly’s top priority was the 
chain monopoly fight, and he did not want to jeopardize it by starting a brawl 
with the press. Apparently, Roosevelt also decided not to give the publishers an 
additional reason to accuse him of harboring dictatorial aspirations as he sought 
a third term. A month after his reelection in November 1940, however, Roosevelt 
pointedly asked Fly for an update.278 The FCC chairman replied that although 
there should be “as many independent channels of information and commun-
ication as possible,” he needed time to plan hearings on the issue, lest they 
seemed motivated by “punitive political considerations towards the press.”279 
Rumor had it that Fly “did not really agree” with a press-radio ban.280 
Still, in March 1941, his FCC put a hold on FM licenses to newspapers pending 
hearings on what policies or rules, “if any,” were necessary.281 When the 
hearing convened in July 1941, Fly announced that the FCC would proceed in 
a “spirit of fact-finding.”282 He and his commissioners had not decided that a 
rule was needed or, if so, whether it should come from the FCC or Congress.283 
Between July and December 1941, the FCC devoted seventeen days to 
hearings but then adjourned them without acting but also without lifting the 
hold on FM licenses. Thereafter, the election of an anti-New Deal Congress in 
																																								 																				
277 The Reminiscences of James Rowe (Aug. 1, 1967), in FLY PROJECT, supra note 132, at 2. 
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STAMM, supra note 52, at 108–45 (describing the FCC’s newspaper-radio investigation); 
BRINSON, supra note 262, at 44–47 (summarizing the FCC hearings to review newspaper 
ownership of radio stations); PICKARD, supra note 267, at 45–51 (explaining the FCC’s 
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(Jul. 23, 1941), at 3, in FLY PAPERS, supra note 232, box 26 (emphasis added). 
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November 1942 and the antics of an outrageously partisan congressional 
investigation, convened in July 1943 and headed by Eugene Cox, made a ban 
was, as Rauh put it, “too much even for Larry Fly.”284 In January 1944, the 
FCC announced it would adopt no special rule for newspaper ownership, “in 
light of the record in this proceeding and of the grave legal and policy questions 
involved.”285 Instead, it would continue to apply “the general principle that 
diversification of control of [the] media is desirable.”286 
World War II brought new responsibilities, pressure from the Depart-
ment of Justice to engage in wiretapping, congressional red-baiting of FCC 
employees, and the harassment of the Cox Committee.287 Still, during his five 
years as chairman, Fly, assisted by his very able lawyers, made the FCC an 
independent and powerful force against concentrated power in the media. 
 
IX. FROM THE SHALLOW STATE TO THE DEEP STATE? 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt won the Democratic nomination for president in 
1932 by excelling at rather than disrupting existing political practices.288 In his 
first term, he did not renounce the patronage politics that got him elected. To be 
sure, he named more university professors and elite professionals to federal jobs 
than had his predecessors, but he also appointed many seasoned politicos whose 
support he needed in Congress and to win reelection in 1936.289 His staffing of 
the AAA, the National Recovery Administration, and other new agencies did 
lead to complaints that “the faithful office holders of yesterday have been forced 
to take a back seat and make room for the bright young men from Harvard and 
Columbia,” but those appointments still left plenty of other jobs and patronage 
for the party faithful.290 To service this constituency, then, Roosevelt initially left 
the FCC becalmed within the Shallow State, subject to repeated boardings by 
marauding bands of politicians, network lobbyists, and radio lawyers. 
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During much of his second term, however, Roosevelt, angry with Con-
gressional Democrats for opposing his Court-packing plan, experimented with 
governing through a network of lawyers and other executive branch 
officials.291 Cleaning up the FCC now struck him as good politics. He gave 
Corcoran leave to try, but the FCC’s old-line Law Department was not up to 
the task.292 Only after Fly, a member of the legal network, became chairman 
and appointed aggressive, able, and ambitious lawyers to the Law Department 
did FCC set sail.293 Congressmen did not stop calling, but their intercessions 
counted for less during Fly’s chairmanship than they did during those of his  
predecessors in the 1950s.294  
If Fly’s “shock troops” rescued the FCC from the Shallow State, did they 
imperil liberal democracy in the process? Scholars of “competitive authoritarian-
ism” have observed that “[d]iscretionary economic power furnishes incumbents 
with powerful tools to compel compliance and punish opposition.”295 Media 
licenses have been among the most effective of these “economic policy levers,” 
and they offer would-be authoritarians the additional advantage of controlling 
the flow of information to the populace.296 Did FDR contemplate putting Fly’s 
FCC to authoritarian ends? If so, did the chairman and his lawyers abet or resist 
their president? And if Fly’s FCC heeded neither patronage-hungry congress-
men nor Roosevelt’s occasional authoritarian impulses, did they pursue their 
own agenda, like the shadowy conspirators of Deep State theorists’ fever dreams? 
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The answer to each question, it seems, is no. First, although FDR did 
pursue a ban on newspaper ownership of radio stations, his interest in indivi-
dual licensing hearings was sporadic and idiosyncratic. The tangential 
involvement of one of his sons apparently did prompt a White House inquiry 
into a dispute over New York City’s WMCA.297 Roosevelt also instructed 
Rowe to “get a stopper with Fly” on any move against the University of 
Georgia’s license,298 and he interceded on behalf of a hard-pressed station in 
Poughkeepsie, “not as President of the United States, but as a citizen of 
Dutchess County!”299 But the FCC only occasionally figured in his political 
calculations, and it figured in them even less as he readied the nation for war. 
Rowe appreciated this when he reminded his boss that if he did not back Fly 
he could expect to be “harassed day in and day out with the interminable details 
of what in these times is an unimportant struggle from the point of view of the 
President.”300 
Second, although Fly was, in Rowe’s estimation, “the most loyal 
supporter the President has,” he did not let loyalty keep him from slowing 
FDR’s pursuit of the press-radio ban or from challenging the influence of the 
president’s confidantes.301 For example, to circumvent press secretary Stephen 
Early and another journalist temporarily ensconced in the White House, Fly 
rushed the release of the chain monopoly report after getting Corcoran to elicit 
what Fly could plausibly characterize as FDR’s approval.302 Fly’s forceful 
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congressional testimony against the Department of Justice’s request for 
broader statutory power to wiretap earned him a rebuke from Roosevelt that 
left him scrambling to explain how, as Rauh ruefully put it, he could “commit 
treason without fault.”303 
Third, although the radio industry complained that the FCC went 
“beyond any powers conferred in the law,” Fly and his shock troops carefully 
gauged and stayed within the statutory and political limits set by Congress.304 
When attacking the networks or opposing wiretapping, they could point to 
specific provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 rather than simply the 
“public convenience, interest, or necessity” standard.305 They also declined to 
adopt a press-radio ban that lacked congressional support.306 The Cox 
Committee did accuse the FCC of “arrogating to itself the determination of 
matters of legislative policy resting solely within the competency of Congress,” 
but even Louis Caldwell thought this charge baseless.307 Fly and his legal 
lieutenants retained influential allies on Capitol Hill. Telford Taylor remained 
close to his former boss, Burton Wheeler, who had urged the FCC to complete 
the chain monopoly report and defended the FCC’s rulemaking authority.308 
Hatton Sumners, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, was Fly’s congress-
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man and claimed to have known his “family intimately for forty years.”309 
Another powerful Texan in the House, Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, 
protected Fly when a congressional investigation strayed into his personal 
life.310 George Norris, the great progressive senator, praised Fly for his 
“unlimited courage” in “almost endless legal fights with the monopolists.”311 
In sum, the history of the FCC in the mid-twentieth century suggests 
that an able, ambitious, and authoritative legal staff was not a threat to liberal 
democracy in the United States but was necessary for the public-regarding 
allocation and use of a valuable collective good. In the 1930s, the most pressing 
challenge was not an authoritarian in the White House but political parties 
centered in Congress and bound together by patronage, as well as the lobbyists 
and lawyers who served industry’s and politicians’ needs. In a milder and more 
localized form, radio regulation before Fly illustrates the point the political 
scientist Stephens Holmes made more generally for Russia after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union: “state incapacity” can threaten liberal democratic values 
quite as thoroughly as can “despotic power.”312  
Today, a president more given to authoritarian impulses than Roosevelt 
occupies the White House, and his political party in Congress is less inclined 
to challenge him than were Democrats after the Court-packing plan. Further, 
President Trump has castigated the FCC for balking at a merger sought by one 
of his media supporters, and he has repeatedly denounced the media as “the 
enemy of the people.”313 In such times, a point stated generally by Gillian 
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Metzger but illustrated particularly by the midcentury history of the FCC is 
especially apt. The very features of the administrative state that today’s critics 
condemn, Professor Metzger observes, including “bureaucracy with its internal 
oversight mechanisms and expert civil service, are essential for the 
accountable, constrained, and effective exercise of executive power.” Fly and 
his lawyers did not just, in Metzger’s words, enable “effective governance”; 
they also “mitigate[d] the dangers of presidential unilateralism.”314 They 
illustrated how government lawyers can steer their agencies into channels that 
are neither shallow nor deep but liberal democratic. 
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